As for Rand's limited influence on subsequent development in philosophy, that's an interesting point. Why is this the case? Even if you disagree with Rand's philosophy, I think it's pretty outrageous that her work isn't even mentioned in more university philosophy programs. There are only a few other philosophers whose work provides as complete a system for understanding reality, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of ethics (I'd include Aristotle, Plato, and Hegel as others that are similarly complete, but there aren't too many after that).
So why is Rand's work not taught more often? I'd say that is mostly the result of the biases and predilections of the typical university philosophy department.
There are now quite a number of Ayn Rand philosophy chairs at various high profile universites in the country.
It's funny, but one of the reasons Rand is coming into universities these days is the attitude that no theory is any better than any other i.e, subjectivism. The very thing that Rand spent so much time attacking! (I got this from talking to the guys who run the Ayn Rand Institute, which is largley responsible for these developments.)
Edit: Regarding Nietzsche, you are 100% corrent. For what it's worth Rand was adamant that her ethics was nothing like Nietzsche. Here's the most positive thing she had to say about him: "as a poet, he projects at times (not consistently)a magnificent feeling for man's greatness, expressed in emotional, not intellectual terms."
When you really dig into Rand, her ethics are essentially a modernized version of Aristotle's virtue ethics. Most of her ethical theory revolved around core values (Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem) and virtues that supported these values (Pride, Rationality, Integrity, Productiveness, Independence, and Justice). Many argue she left out a few important virtues like benevolence, but overall it's a pretty good and useful list. She didn't necessarily agree with Aristotle's "Doctrine of the Mean" (virtue is the mean between two extremes), but otherwise her ethics are very Aristotelian.
I think that to qualify as a philosophy, something must be a system of thought that proposes a notion of metaphysics, epistemology, and a system of ethics. Rand's "output" obviously qualifies, whether you happen to agree with it or not.
Intelligent design and time cube theory ought not to be taught because they can be objectively verified as false. Such a test plainly does not apply to philosophy -- and even if it did, it would disqualify plenty of philosophers who are taught, such as the pre-Socratic philosopher Thales.
Well, for a start, there was the fact that she reviewed, and dismissed on "philosophical" grounds, a book of Immanuel Kant's after she read the back cover. Sure, that's an example, but by no means an atypical one. She dismissed nearly everything after Aristotle, usually on superficial grounds. Such wholesale dismissal of the established field, such grandiosity of claims (especially in the face of such shallow thinking) has direct parallels with pseudoscience.
> I would personally say that to qualify as a philosophy, something must be a system of thought that proposes a notion of metaphysics, epistemology, and a system of ethics. Rand's "output" obviously qualifies
...for a definition of "philosophy" you have pretty much quoted verbatim from her work, but without admitting that or even acknowledging the existence of alternative perspectives? You do see the problem with that, don't you...?
> Intelligent design and time cube theory ought not to be taught because they can be objectively verified as false.
No. They can't. That's the whole point of pseudoscience - if their claims were verifiable but wrong, it would just be forgotten. But pseudoscientists make unverifiable claims precisely in order to claim that because their claims have not been disproven, they should be given parity.
As for teaching Thales, how does one teach that Socrates was an advance if one does not teach what he was advancing from? Similarly, the Rutherford model of the atom is still mentioned in science classes - by your logic it should be forgotten as pseudoscience, but it wasn't. One cannot teach science without teaching that models are superseded by better models as they are created - that is the very nature of the scientific process. And the reason science and philosophy were commingled until a couple of centuries ago is that it's at the heart of the philosophical process too. One rejects models because one can demonstrate that an alternative model better fits the observable reality; one doesn't superficially reject them without bothering to understand them first because one finds their implications in disagreement with the conclusions one is seeking to prove!
This is utterly irrelevant to the point in question. Rand's attitude toward other philosophers was pretty uninformed, I agree, but it is evidence of Rand herself being silly, superficial, etc., The point is that those are properties of Rand, not of her philosophy. To equate her (many) imperfections as an individual with inherent properties of her philosophy is essentially an ad hominem argument -- and it's even more debatable that merely dismissing the alternatives to one's theory automatically makes your own theory "pseudophilosophy".
As for my definition of philosophy, sure, it is also Rand's view, but I think it is fairly reasonable. Surely a philosophy must include some claims about 1. the nature of reality 2. our ability to understand that reality, if any 3. how we ought to act within that reality. If you think it's such a flawed definition, what definition would you prefer, and how does Rand's "output" not qualify?
As for ID/etc. being provably false, I agree with you, I mispoke. But I still don't see how you've proven, or even really supported, your argument that Rand is somehow "pseudophilosophy", and other systems of thought are "real" philosophy. That just sounds like superficial bigotry to me -- actually the same sort of thing you accuse Rand of, with respect to Kant.
Please provide a reference.
2. You don't like his definition of philsophy.
What definition do you like?
3. You claim pseudophilosophy should not be taught in philosophy classes.
Anyone and everyone agrees with that point. You still leave open the issue of whether Rand's work is in fact pseudophilosophy. Please support your claims.
See above. The books in which I could have located a reference are long gone; but it's in one of her short essays (if pushed, I'd suggest that it might be found in For the New Intellectual... but wouldn't want to be held to that).
> What definition do you like?
From wikipedia: "Different philosophers have had varied ideas about the nature of reason, and there is also disagreement about the subject matter of philosophy." If not even the people who do it professionally can agree on a definition, it would be presumptuous of me to try.
Nonetheless, you misread my objection. I am objecting to the assertion that Rand's work is without question philosophy, using the definition of philosophy by which Rand identified herself as one. It's tautological; it begs the question.
Likewise, my criticism of Rand is not that her conclusions are not reasonable conclusions (although I have my own opinions on that). It is that the methods by which she reached those conclusions are not those of a serious philosophical investigation. Rand's entire "philosophy" was carefully contrived to justify the conclusions she wanted justified, and that makes it worthless as philosophy - and inherently dishonest, to boot.
> You still leave open the issue of whether Rand's work is in fact pseudophilosophy.
I haven't even presented a definition of pseudophilosophy, let alone one you have agreed upon, so it's hard to see how you can assert that I haven't proved my case. So:
: I define "pseudophilosophy" as "justification masquerading as philosophy" - or, to elaborate, "a contrived rationalisation of a priori conclusions, constructed primarily to justify those conclusions rather than to examine their validity".
: I claim that the evidence of Rand's flight to the US from revolutionary Russia, and the emotions expressed in her early fiction (primarily We the Living and Anthem, but even back as far as The Husband I Bought) demonstrate the a priori nature of her strident individualism and anti-collectivism. I do not criticise this; indeed, I have a lot of sympathy with it.
: I note that her philosophical oeuvre developed over the next few decades, from its clumsy emotive (and none the worse for that) beginnings in Anthem, through its 30-year gestation in The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, to its expression in direct form in works such as For The New Intellectual and Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal.
: I therefore conclude that in this case, she contrived her philosophical justification to fit her a priori conclusions about the rightness of capitalism and the abhorrence of altruism.
Note that I remain in sympathy with the feelings that drove her; indeed, I would go so far as to say that I share them. But to look upon her rationalisation of those feelings as anything other than a rationalisation, the self-justification of a woman who could not allow herself to simply be, is something I find absurd.
"Worthless" is far overstating the case: in general it is hard to prove very much about the true motivations of philosophers, particularly long-dead ones. For example, it is quite likely that the exact lines of reasoning in Descartes' Meditations was contrived to reach the conclusions he wanted to reach beforehand, but to say that makes the whole thing "worthless" is pretty silly. Many philosophers can be criticized as developing rational arguments for positions they hold intuitively.
> Many philosophers can be criticized as developing rational arguments for positions they hold intuitively.
Indeed, but the key is doing so from a position of trying to prove your intuitively-held position wrong, and I'd suggest that this is what distinguishes philosophers. Some of them - for instance, Wittgenstein - even manage to do it.
Going back to the science analogy, new hypotheses are accepted not once supporting evidence is found - even UFOs have supporting evidence, after all! - but only for as long as attempts to produce confounding evidence fail.
If you don't understand how people can make the claim, fine - but please do grasp that all this demonstrates is the paucity of your understanding.
(Anyway, the majority of Rand's work takes the form of non-fictional essays. Her novels made her name, but it's clear she saw them only as means to an end.)
Since most pseudo-scientists have a genuine concern over some problem, and they have obviously acquired what little scientific exposure they did from their schooling, then I claim that if more science classes covered pseudo-science, explaining why it is not true science, then I predict a distinct drop in pseudo-science will result.
I tend to think of Rand's work as the canonical example of a philosophy that is defined primarily by its _claims of_ being objective, systematic, and rational.
But isn't that the point? Its the only reason I have an interest in philosophy.
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> didn't have an effect on later developments in philosophy
And in a sense, Paul was arguing against that in this essay. When you think about it, it was exactly this effect that has lead Philosophy to remain so stagnant for so many years.
-People are self interested.
-This is not a bad thing.
I think those are pretty good axioms to build upon. I don't think Rand came up with a grand unified theory of human behavior but she started from the right place... As opposed to our Greek ancestors...
As Paul mentioned in his essay, you're already bumping into what words mean.
I can tell you what an integer is, what a square root is, and what a ratio is, and as a result, I can (by looking it up in a book and typing in the text, heh heh) prove that the square root of 2 can't be expressed as the ratio of two integers. But can we do the same thing with the phrase "self interested"? Without pushing the meaning of words out to their breaking point?
Not without words you can't.
"Ratio", "Square Root", and "Integer" have precise definitions, whereas "self interest" is imprecise.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_incompleteness_the...
The refinement you're talking about here isn't so much a matter of modifying an incorrect but exact definition as it is clarifying an irrefutable but ambiguous definition.
That said, maybe something could come of this if you truly got to the very basic building blocks. For instance, an integer is just a definition - an exact one, but a definition nonetheless. So we can define a rational number as the ratio of two integers, and then build a refutable hypothesis from it - that all numbers are either integers or the ratio of integers.
I have serious doubts as to whether "self interest" could ever be defined as precisely as an integer, though.
Calling into question the meaning of "self-interested" is merely a filibuster.
Try this out: at a dinner party (one that you don't care if you're invited back), declare that "all people act out of self-interest, ultimately."
Odds are good that two people will disagree quite vehemently about this, and at the core will be a fundamental disagreement about what it means to be "self-interested".
For anyone interested, I have a site http://www.ImportanceOfPhilosophy.com that explains why I think philosophy is so important and which is mainly based on Ayn Rand's philosophy.