Real cryptographic voting systems use verifiable protocols. You don't trust the machine, you force it to follow a protocol that involves proving its actions are correct at every step.
You can verify basically everything except destruction of information (i.e. there's no way to prove with cryptography that a video camera didn't record the voter).
Video with an example of a verifiable voting protocol: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDnShu5V99s
Last time I checked the protocols had several drawbacks (including the "destruction" problem, vulnerable to collusion, etc.) Maybe I missed good protocols? Could you please point me to good papers? (a video is too slow and hard to skim over).
Thanks! I'll check the video ASAP and report back if I have questions!
I mainly commented to remind people that computer voting systems don't have to be glorified counters. You can actually use their strengths (crypto), instead of only inheriting their weaknesses (malleability).
It probably should be about the data. The data should be openly available to everyone.
But there are some requirements to the data that make this tricky (understatement).
With the data in your hand it should be possible to independently verify the results. It should be possible to individually verify that your vote is somehow in there. But it should NOT be possible to link votes to individuals, it should be completely anonymous.
This is not a problem that is likely to be solved by software engineers. If there is a solution, it is in crypto and math more than software.
I do think this is an important problem to solve. It would enable the ultimate democratization. Instead of voting for representatives it would become feasible to directly vote on issues by referendum. If tech is about anything, it's about democratization and cutting out the middle man.
This doesn't mean that you couldn't or shouldn't have a paper trail as well. As long as you have a single end-point, then yes, the issues you brought up are valid.
Super easy, you should go shopping.
If this problem were so trivial, then I think some of the big names in crypto would not have wasted their time on studying solutions. As it is, though, I don't think there are any convincing arguments for why this problem is "trivial." Instead, there's a laundry list of properties you want a good voting protocol to have, and developing a cryptographically secure protocol that satisfies those properties is highly nontrivial.
My opponent did not question particular properties of this scheme but instead went on the tangent of properties, which none of voting methods currently has. Hence, she or he could as well request cancer cure.
Unless you know how to use this huge product of primes to verify that votes have been counted correctly.
Good call about the disabled. What are the current systems doing for them?
There are many systems for the disabled -- it was a big priority of the Help America Votes Act, which is what prompted this wave of computerized voting machines. The Auto
You can envision a system as complicated as you want, but it'll always have some sort of flaw because, well, bits are bits. I've had this discussion with many people and the same solutions arise again and again... but most are useless.
You could get the source code for the voting program... what if your compiler is backdoored? You could compile the compiler yourself, with which compiler? The backdoored one?
And even if the compiler is trustworthy... who's guaranteeing that the real binary is installed in the machine? You could download it in an USB drive and check yourself or get a hash from the machine but... how can you be sure the machine is reporting the binary that's actually running and not just a fake reply? Could you trust the reported MD5/downloaded binary from the machine?
Easy! - you say - You could upload the binary yourself to the machine! But how would you be sure you're running the uploaded binary and not a fake one?
And what if any of the machines inbetween are rigged?
Then cryptoguys come in: you could digitally sign your vote (forget secrecy) with a state-issued certificate (we have those in Spain with our NID). Maybe encrypt it so that only the far end could read it. You'd then check if your vote's been cast fine online. But how'd you be sure you got the real result?
Once the data left the machine you have to trust that everything's fine on the receiving end. What if the vote count just ignores votes and just does whatever it wants?
And the worst of all... how's your granny supposed to check it herself?
There are some advanced cryptographic techniques relevant to e-vote (some are quite clever) but even the best cryptographers will tell you: do not trust electronic voting!
My advice is: keep with pen and paper! It's easy to tamper with too, but more people know how it works and it's easy to see the inner workings compared to bits over the wire.