I personally think that the focus on open recursive resolvers is misplaced. All authoritative nameservers have to be "open" to queries for the domains they serve. So instead of the amplifying by doing: $ host -t any random-site.com. ns1.example.org. you can just as well do: $ host -t any example.org. ns1.example.org. Even if all nameservers supported good per-IP throttling (far from the case), there are still enough valid nameservers on the internet to stage a decent amplification I think. So once all of the open resolvers are shut down, the DDoS pricks will just target more important infrastructure to accomplish the same goal.
It might be that we'll have to switch all authoritative DNS requests to be TCP-only but I can't imagine what a pain that transition will be.
The worse news is that egress filtering has been something we've clearly needed for 15+ years and it doesn't seem we've gotten very far. Part of the problem is that these amplification attacks usually don't cause much pain to the real source of the attack. Plus since it's very hard to tell where the true source is, they don't even get publicly shamed for it. It's so much easier to point a finger at the middle man in this case.
For egress filtering to be effective protection, it needs to cover nearly all of the network. As long as a botnet can get their hands on a decent amount of unfiltered bandwidth to amplify it's game on.
I'm not optimistic.
The question is can it be done without the ISP's co-operation. For example, I've got transit service from XO (a Tier-2 provider) and they could conceivably port-mirror the inbound side from my connection, do a source IP check on packets, (even statistical would be fine) and then raise a flag if anything came out smelly.
Since we're comparing a 32 bit number, and we can construct a logic gate which defines 'legal' values for that number, even a modest FPGA implementation could just sink (equivalent to /dev/null) all traffic and generate a pulse when the match failed. Its been a while since I was in a company building DSLAMs and edge gear but up to a 10Gbit pipe that isn't a killer problem.
Once you move further towards the core, the problem becomes exponentially more complex. Asymmetric routes are common, so it's not weird at all to get a packet handed to you from a different ISP than you would reply to it. Any filtering there would break a large percentage of valid traffic.
The problem is that there are a hell of a lot of "edges", you need nearly all of them to be fixed, and they don't have the motivation to do much about the problem.
The solutions are clear. They happen to be doing the laziest of them which is close the open resolvers.
I've had attacks come from Asia and Russia and none of the hosts respond. I've also tried contacting their upstream providers.
The DNS system needs to be changed.
It needs to change, but I highly doubt it will for at least a few decades. Too many things rely on it, and it would require way too many resources and a miserably long time to change everything to the new thing.
The amplification part of the attack comes from the fact that they aks for zone transfers, and zone transfer replies are much larger than the requests.
If they were just doing normal DNS lookups for records you wouldn't have an amplification factor.
Besides closing down open resolvers, the real solution to this particular DDoS lies in the DNS protocol. The attack's practicality comes from RFC 2671. If that were amended to either return the maximum size of a packet to 512 bytes for UDP packets (but allow TCP packets to be any size), there would be no benefit at all to this attack. For existing resolvers this would require either DNS services being upgraded or firewall rules being put in place to limit UDP packets on port 53 to 512 bytes.
Shutting down open resolvers is about as much work, but unfortunately still leaves the attack possible because it's inherent to the protocol.
But the key here is the source. And this from the article:
"The attackers were able to generate more than 300Gbps of traffic likely with a network of their own that only had access 1/100th of that amount of traffic themselves."
And this is key, so we could hunt them at their source if there was a way of deducing their launch points (it may be a botnet but it may also just be some random server farm)
I've got log records of the form:
Which suggests that 212.199.180.105 is somehow being used, and according my latest GeoIP database that is an IP address in Tel Aviv. So can we create a service where the recurse requests send the IP trying to do the recursion to a service which then inverts the botnet/privatenet? Everytime this level of co-ordination is undertaken it potentially shines a bright light on the part of the Internet that is compromised/bad.