Re:The DDoS that almost broke the Internet
by bodyfour on Wednesday March 27, 2013 @03:26PM
(#5451472)
Near the edge, it's just a matter of using the same silicon you have for routing and ask the question "would I have routed a packet to this claimed source IP down the pipe I'm receiving it from?" In cisco-speak this is "ip verify unicast source reachable-via rx"
Once you move further towards the core, the problem becomes exponentially more complex. Asymmetric routes are common, so it's not weird at all to get a packet handed to you from a different ISP than you would reply to it. Any filtering there would break a large percentage of valid traffic.
The problem is that there are a hell of a lot of "edges", you need nearly all of them to be fixed, and they don't have the motivation to do much about the problem.
The question is can it be done without the ISP's co-operation. For example, I've got transit service from XO (a Tier-2 provider) and they could conceivably port-mirror the inbound side from my connection, do a source IP check on packets, (even statistical would be fine) and then raise a flag if anything came out smelly.
Since we're comparing a 32 bit number, and we can construct a logic gate which defines 'legal' values for that number, even a modest FPGA implementation could just sink (equivalent to /dev/null) all traffic and generate a pulse when the match failed. Its been a while since I was in a company building DSLAMs and edge gear but up to a 10Gbit pipe that isn't a killer problem.