News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by yk on Thursday March 21, 2013 @09:06PM (#5420658)

    Due to a misplaced parenthesis, if insufficient GOOD 
    bits were available to satisfy a request, the 
    keying/rekeying code requested either 32 or 64 ANY bits, 
    rather than the balance of bits required to key the 
    stream generator.
I think this paragraph is a nice reminder, how hard crypto can be.
Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by marshray on Thursday March 21, 2013 @09:17PM (#5420717)
A misplaced parenthesis can corrupt output data from an ordinary programs too. But with crypto, severe problems have a much easier time staying silent through QA and interop testing, and widespread usage.

I think it's because the concept of "cryptographically secure" is essentially trying to prove a negative. That's hard enough in general, but especially hard to do about an intelligent adversary whom you may not even know anything about. You're trying to prove that no present or future attacker will be able to obtain any information which can allow him to unravel your secrets.

Crypto is about building sky castles full of really really long secrets floating on foundations of really small ones, and then tossing them all up in the air to yourself as you run down the street backwards with rabid weasels chasing you.

Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by caf on Thursday March 21, 2013 @10:19PM (#5420970)
In particular CSPRNGs, because the output of a fatally flawed CSPRNG and a secure CSPRNG can look very similar.

This is also why CSPRNGs are a great place to hide backdoors.

Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by yk on Thursday March 21, 2013 @10:44PM (#5421064)
Backdoor in the sense of leaking state?

And is there a case in the wild ( except the PS3 hack?)?

Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by marshray on Friday March 22, 2013 @12:23AM (#5421363)
Best paper Usenix Security '12. Nadia Heninger, UC San Diego; Zakir Durumeric, University of Michigan; Eric Wustrow and J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/mining-yo... "We find that 0.75% of TLS certificates share keys due to insufficient entropy during key generation, and we suspect that another 1.70% come from the same faulty implementations and may be susceptible to compromise. Even more alarmingly, we are able to obtain RSA private keys for 0.50% of TLS hosts and 0.03% of SSH hosts, because their public keys shared nontrivial common factors due to entropy problems, and DSA private keys for 1.03% of SSH hosts, because of insufficient signature randomness."

Ron was wrong, Whit is right Arjen K. Lenstra and James P. Hughes and Maxime Augier and Joppe W. Bos and Thorsten Kleinjung and Christophe Wachter http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/064

Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by ctz on Friday March 22, 2013 @04:10AM (#5421860)
> except the PS3 hack?

To be clear, the PS3 problem was not a problem of randomness quality or a PRNG backdoor. It was illegal nonce reuse in the zero-knowledge proof-of-key-possession protocol embedded in DSA signatures.

Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by wolf550e on Friday March 22, 2013 @07:27AM (#5422306)
Did you mean to use the word "illegal"?
Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by ctz on Friday March 22, 2013 @03:07PM (#5424934)
Sorry 'illegal' in the sense of being contrary to the requirements of the crypto protocol, in the same way that you can have the concept of an 'illegal operation' in a CPU ISA.
Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by lucian1900 on Friday March 22, 2013 @08:40AM (#5422532)
Illegal as in "violating their own crypto policy".
Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel by simcop2387 on Thursday March 21, 2013 @11:10PM (#5421162)
The debian certificate instance is a good example too.

http://digitaloffense.net/tools/debian-openssl/