Best paper Usenix Security '12.
Nadia Heninger, UC San Diego; Zakir Durumeric, University of Michigan; Eric Wustrow and J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/mining-yo...
"We find that 0.75% of TLS certificates share
keys due to insufficient entropy during key generation,
and we suspect that another 1.70% come from the same
faulty implementations and may be susceptible to compromise. Even more alarmingly, we are able to obtain
RSA private keys for 0.50% of TLS hosts and 0.03% of
SSH hosts, because their public keys shared nontrivial
common factors due to entropy problems, and DSA private keys for 1.03% of SSH hosts, because of insufficient
signature randomness."
Ron was wrong, Whit is right Arjen K. Lenstra and James P. Hughes and Maxime Augier and Joppe W. Bos and Thorsten Kleinjung and Christophe Wachter http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/064
> except the PS3 hack?
To be clear, the PS3 problem was not a problem of randomness quality or a PRNG backdoor. It was illegal nonce reuse in the zero-knowledge proof-of-key-possession protocol embedded in DSA signatures.
Did you mean to use the word "illegal"?
Sorry 'illegal' in the sense of being contrary to the requirements of the crypto protocol, in the same way that you can have the concept of an 'illegal operation' in a CPU ISA.
Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel
by lucian1900 on Friday March 22, 2013 @08:40AM
(#5422532)
Illegal as in "violating their own crypto policy".
Re:Critical PRNG Bug in NetBSD Kernel
by simcop2387 on Thursday March 21, 2013 @11:10PM
(#5421162)
The debian certificate instance is a good example too.
And is there a case in the wild ( except the PS3 hack?)?