No. In an educational setting, lax security is a feature.
Which makes me very curious about what the vulnerabilities they want to redact ARE.
Unless they are just being totally ridiculous and insisting on redacting things everyone already knows and were never secrets in the first place, like that any device can get on their network.
Not only am I curious about what the vulnerabilities are (in general), I'm more curious as to why they were ever sent.
Is it just email where network engineers mused about known-vulnerabilities while discussing 'how Swartz got on the network'? Or was MIT making additional accusations against Aaron, that they would prefer to let plunge down the memory hole to avoid being seen as having been party to the prosecution trying to 'throw the book' at Swartz?
That said, it's possible that a general document sweep, answering a subpoena, also swept up documents describing, say, internal routing policies, or technical measures protecting access to student records, or something like that, which would be tangentially relevant to the case, and which they would have some legitimate interest in keeping to themselves.
It would appear that regardless of what MIT does, it would be up to the court when and how to release the un-redacted version.
....and MIT, for Fks sake, get your Network security together, that is really not a great reflection on your reputation as world class engineering org.