Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by randomdata on Saturday February 16, 2013 @06:06AM
(#5231147)
There was a, presumably serious, post made here about Rails that was almost word-for-word, save the differing technical terms. The post here was obviously making fun of that other post, but I guess that would be lost without the prior context.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by hysterix on Saturday February 16, 2013 @12:20PM
(#5232170)
I love how ruby fanboy/fanaticism is not downvoted. Just look at your about page. "ruby by day, rails by night" No, no bias to be seen here, move along!
You are a complete moron. This isn't even comparable with those ruby vulns, they were remote, this isn't.
It is pretty obvious ruby isn't a fully mature platform to develop on, there has been dozens of posts illustrating that. Linux is a stable operating system that is fully mature and capable of running enterprise level software. The fact I need to point this out to you says you are either a troll, or living in denial, either of which are hilarious.
The level of fanaticism towards ruby on this site is unbelievable. Ruby is an immature platform, I'm sorry if this fact makes your stomach turn circles and keeps you up at night.
As illustrated here, http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5230358 "But even with access, this is awfully hard to exploit. You need a precisely timed kill, followed by a precisely timed preemption. That's really (really) hard on a multi-cpu machine" This exploit isn't even in the same league as the remote vulns for ruby. There was a working exploit within a day! The fact you'd even make comparison of the two shows how ignorant you really are.
Posts like this make me laugh because I'm sure you will be jumping on the next band wagon whenever the next popular thing comes riding through town, and will probably be vehemently defending that when it has vulnerabilities.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by onedognight on Saturday February 16, 2013 @12:21AM
(#5230495)
First, this is local exploit. Second, most distributions do not allow access to realtime scheduling by regular users. In particular, a simple for(;;); at the highest SCHED_FIFO priority will lock the box. You can check
/etc/security/limits.conf
to see which users / groups are allowed a higher than normal rtprio.
That being said, often pulseaudio and/or jackd are given realtime priviledges, so I assume people will be looking at them.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by vetrom on Saturday February 16, 2013 @01:26PM
(#5232410)
As a matter of fact, I also just realized that it may be possible that nice-ing the 'victim' process down to -20 may also make it easier, and is a non-privileged operation almost everywhere.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by jewel on Saturday February 16, 2013 @12:30AM
(#5230513)
For me a lot of it feels like noise. Back when I was in charge of security at a payment processor I was subscribed to all the relevant mailing lists (as required by the PCI DSS). Now that I'm working with something less valuable I just rely on apticron + nullmailer to notify me of important security updates to system packages, and the rails security mailing list for rails.
It'd be wonderful if something similar were implemented for rubygems. If security updates were marked in some way, a cron job could scan my Gemfiles periodically and then check each gem to see if any security updates have been released.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by FooBarWidget on Saturday February 16, 2013 @07:29AM
(#5231284)
There have been multiple local kernel exploits in the past few years. For somebody who doesn't constantly watch seclists.org or similar security sites, how do I find out whether my kernel is vulnerable to any known exploit? Is there a tool that can help me with checking? Is there a notification tool?
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by Rovanion on Saturday February 16, 2013 @12:32PM
(#5232222)
I just set my distro to automatically install security fixes from my distributor. Only requires a reboot for kernel updates and it is a no effort solution to the problem.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by ajross on Friday February 15, 2013 @11:20PM
(#5230358)
Yes, ptrace can be globally disabled by a file in /proc somewhere, I believe. I forget the details.
But even with access, this is awfully hard to exploit. You need a precisely timed kill, followed by a precisely timed preemption. That's really (really) hard on a multi-cpu machine, and it's worth pointing out that the exerciser case in the bug has to patch in a sleep for the exploit to work. It's not clear if they have a real world exploit running, though of course the race is real.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by tedunangst on Friday February 15, 2013 @11:48PM
(#5230432)
There's no penalty for losing the race and trying again. It's not like it's making noise and filling up logs or anything like that. Maybe somebody would notice the CPU spinning if you're hammering it, but that's avoidable.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by ajross on Saturday February 16, 2013 @12:13AM
(#5230474)
That's true, of course. But time is still a finite resource and it's possible to have a theoretical race with a window so narrow that it can't actually be exploited in feasible time. The fact that the proof of concept had to artificially open the window is evidence that this might be such a situation. It's still a hole; it just might not be big enough to push a hack through.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by lawnchair_larry on Saturday February 16, 2013 @12:54AM
(#5230561)
You're speculating, but you're wrong, FYI. You're also wrong that the PoC requires a patch to work. That's just to make the window gaping and foolproof, basically.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by ajross on Saturday February 16, 2013 @12:30PM
(#5232207)
Better to speculate and be wrong than assert without evidence. How long does the exploit take to run successfully on your test system? Did you even build it? I did, and it doesn't. Go away.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by lawnchair_larry on Saturday February 16, 2013 @02:57PM
(#5232749)
You asserted without evidence. I've successfully run it repeatedly. You don't have to believe me, but in dismissing the impact, you're making a common error. Probability of the event occurring naturally has very little to do with risk, particularly when there are no consequences for failing.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by sounds on Saturday February 16, 2013 @06:05AM
(#5231146)
Has anyone estimated the probability of success? What is the average number of attempts to get the scheduling conditions to happen?
Assume the user can get access to a CPU core that is otherwise idle. sched_setaffinity(2) will succeed when run by the process to set its own affinity to a specific core, so the attacker can locate the processes on a chosen core. (The attacker could spend a few milliseconds first to find an idle core.)
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by rbanffy on Saturday February 16, 2013 @05:46AM
(#5231115)
> I thought the responsible thing to do was not announce it until there was some headstart time?
I may be wrong, but from the report, it seems to be a somewhat difficult local exploit that can lead to privilege escalation. While it's serious in that it allows arbitrary code to run in kernel space, it also seems to pose a low risk due to how hard it is to put all the required pieces in place.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by X-Istence on Saturday February 16, 2013 @02:47PM
(#5232717)
There is responsible disclosure, full disclosure and no disclosure.
I'll take the first two over the last any day of the week. It may be responsible, but there certainly isn't a requirement to do responsible disclosure.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by csense on Friday February 15, 2013 @11:14PM
(#5230345)
Can anyone explain what access is necessary to use this attack?
I'm guessing anyone with shell access (can run arbitrary shell commands from an unprivileged account) will be able to use this to get root. But that's just a guess; kernel experts are welcome to weigh in.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by astrodust on Friday February 15, 2013 @11:20PM
(#5230359)
Any application that has a vulnerability can run arbitrary code, such as an insufficiently patched WordPress, could enable privilege escalation using this flaw.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by sounds on Saturday February 16, 2013 @06:00AM
(#5231143)
That's a bit of an exaggeration, because this requires a precise race condition.
The race condition is very possible but fairly unlikely unless you apply the Proof-of-Concept patch to make a huge gaping delay in the kernel where the exploit can run.
WordPress probably has unpatched vulnerabilities, but it would take many thousands of attempts to exploit this hole.
Re:CVE-2013-0871: Linux arbitrary kernel-mode code execution
by thefreeman on Friday February 15, 2013 @11:34PM
(#5230400)
There isn't even a working exploit yet. As someone else mentioned, they include a kernel patch with their proof of concept to allow you to reproduce it.
Honestly, how much longer are we going to build on this house of shaky cards?
Did they really think that letting a race condition happen on PTRACE_SETREGS was a good idea? Just for "elegance sake"? Come on.
Everyone could tell that none of ptrace/jctl callers actually want to wakeup a TASK_WAKEKILL task, but they can't specify the necessary mask.
My startup still runs Cobol on Cogs in DOS (and we serve over 9000 requests per second on a single DigitalOcean $5 box!).
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubi_sunt
Oh dear!
The problem with trying to sound so stupid you can't possibly be serious is that there are people who are seriously that stupid.
[1] http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/PoesLaw
just kidding, of course it was the last line
You are a complete moron. This isn't even comparable with those ruby vulns, they were remote, this isn't.
It is pretty obvious ruby isn't a fully mature platform to develop on, there has been dozens of posts illustrating that. Linux is a stable operating system that is fully mature and capable of running enterprise level software. The fact I need to point this out to you says you are either a troll, or living in denial, either of which are hilarious.
The level of fanaticism towards ruby on this site is unbelievable. Ruby is an immature platform, I'm sorry if this fact makes your stomach turn circles and keeps you up at night.
As illustrated here, http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5230358 "But even with access, this is awfully hard to exploit. You need a precisely timed kill, followed by a precisely timed preemption. That's really (really) hard on a multi-cpu machine" This exploit isn't even in the same league as the remote vulns for ruby. There was a working exploit within a day! The fact you'd even make comparison of the two shows how ignorant you really are.
Posts like this make me laugh because I'm sure you will be jumping on the next band wagon whenever the next popular thing comes riding through town, and will probably be vehemently defending that when it has vulnerabilities.
/whoosh, right over someone's head.
That being said, often pulseaudio and/or jackd are given realtime priviledges, so I assume people will be looking at them.
It'd be wonderful if something similar were implemented for rubygems. If security updates were marked in some way, a cron job could scan my Gemfiles periodically and then check each gem to see if any security updates have been released.
For debian, you should subscribe to http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/ - and you'll get an email as soon as updates are published. These are also published at http://www.debian.org/security/
You can also follow security bugs closely on the security tracker. For example, this vulnerability is classified here: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2013-0871 and the full list of bugs affecting the stable kernel is here: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/source-package/l...
edit: as in, does yama.ptrace_scope prevent anyone without root and/or CAP_SYS_PTRACE from exploiting this?
But even with access, this is awfully hard to exploit. You need a precisely timed kill, followed by a precisely timed preemption. That's really (really) hard on a multi-cpu machine, and it's worth pointing out that the exerciser case in the bug has to patch in a sleep for the exploit to work. It's not clear if they have a real world exploit running, though of course the race is real.
Assume the user can get access to a CPU core that is otherwise idle. sched_setaffinity(2) will succeed when run by the process to set its own affinity to a specific core, so the attacker can locate the processes on a chosen core. (The attacker could spend a few milliseconds first to find an idle core.)
Oh wait, nope, not addressed: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-0223.html
I thought the responsible thing to do was not announce it until there was some headstart time?
Strangely it's not in the redhat db yet at all
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2013-0871
I may be wrong, but from the report, it seems to be a somewhat difficult local exploit that can lead to privilege escalation. While it's serious in that it allows arbitrary code to run in kernel space, it also seems to pose a low risk due to how hard it is to put all the required pieces in place.
Also, there are already corrections available.
I'll take the first two over the last any day of the week. It may be responsible, but there certainly isn't a requirement to do responsible disclosure.
I'm guessing anyone with shell access (can run arbitrary shell commands from an unprivileged account) will be able to use this to get root. But that's just a guess; kernel experts are welcome to weigh in.
The race condition is very possible but fairly unlikely unless you apply the Proof-of-Concept patch to make a huge gaping delay in the kernel where the exploit can run.
WordPress probably has unpatched vulnerabilities, but it would take many thousands of attempts to exploit this hole.