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Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by agl on Saturday February 09, 2013 @03:23PM (#5193866)
(Copying this reply of mine from another part of the thread as you're not the only person to ask.)

Name Constraints support is pretty good in modern certificate libraries. It's certainly in CryptoAPI these days which accounts for the bulk of users.

But there are two ways to use Name Constraints: they can be marked critical or non-critical.

Critical Name Constraints are great, but they will cause anything that doesn't support Name Constraints to reject the certificate. This is obviously a problem because few deployments have much control over their client base.

Non-critical name constraints provide a security benefit to clients that support them without affecting those that do not. Clients that don't support them are vulnerable to misuse of the constrained certificate, of course, but since the alternative is often an unconstrained, CA certificate, it's still a clear win.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @04:23PM (#5194073)
Non-critical name constraints provide a security benefit to clients that support them without affecting those that do not.

The sole raison d'être for the entire CA infrastructure is to prevent active MITM-style attacks. So from that perspective what you said is positively Orwellian.

Noncritical name constraints absolutely do affect clients that don't support them. It reduces their security by making them vulnerable to MitM!

The entire purpose of the critical flag was to allow evolving the PKI system without reducing security for existing systems. We ought not set the flag FALSE because the CA's big customers prefer flexibility to the security of the whole ecosystem.

Clients that don't support them are vulnerable to misuse of the constrained certificate, of course, but since the alternative is often an unconstrained, CA certificate, it's still a clear win.

A false dichotomy being imposed by a well-funded minority for which it serves their interests.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @04:32PM (#5194103)
Non-critical nameExtensions protect Chrome, IE and Firefox. They don't protect Safari.

Critical nameExtensions protect Chrome, IE, Firefox, and (because Safari will barf on them) Safari.

NO nameExtensions protects nothing.

Adam's point is simply that non-critical name extensions strictly dominate unconstrained certificates. His point isn't Orwellian at all.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @04:46PM (#5194147)
non-critical name extensions strictly dominate unconstrained certificates

Don't you see how, once again, the CA industry has shifted the debate from the level of security everyone expected them to provide all along to another lesser of two evils?

The discussion isn't about whether or not we must require name constraints on 3rd-party sub-CAs to be marked 'critical'. The issue is that the world of SSL/TLS client application users and developers believe, expect, and rely upon the non-proliferation of private keys with the ability to forge identities for the servers to which they connect.

So, yeah, maybe it's more Overton than Orwellian.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @05:34PM (#5194363)
The hell? Marsh, Adam Langley is one of the good guys.

The stuff he's talking about does exactly the opposite of what you claim it's surreptitiously doing.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @05:59PM (#5194465)
Oh look, I have deep admiration for AGL. I like RMH too! I agree that they are "good guys".

But this is not about the the person or the corporation. It's about the users of PKI and the massive existing code infrastructure (not just browsers) they rely upon today and the attacks to which our systems may or may not be vulnerable under the different CA issuance policies.

RFC 5280: 4.2.1.10. Name Constraints: Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as critical

Sure, there are times when bending the rules of an RFC may be the right thing to do. But breaking this rule violates an interface contract critical for security, thereby retro-actively reducing the security of conformant implementations.

Therefore, users and developers of existing security products must oppose this violation of RFCs.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:05PM (#5194492)
You keep citing the RFC as if it mattered. What matters in reality are the judgements of Microsoft, Google, Mozilla, and Apple (the HTTPS cabal). That this is annoying does not change its underlying truth.

Of those four organizations, I feel like I could make a strong argument that Google is the one with the best activist stance on improving Internet privacy, the one doing the most to improve the core HTTPS infrastructure.

The RFC you're citing is the product of a bunch of people sitting in a room talking. RFC policies do not bind organizations. About the most you can say about them is that they mean the HTTPS cabal is using something other than HTTPS. Ok, but that is the mother of all [sp]e[md]antic arguments. (Can we use "spemdantic" from now on?)

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:37PM (#5194593)
Oh, I hold no illusion of the infallability of the IETF process!

But at the end of the day the world needs to have secure SSL/TLS applications. This requires it to be possible for "one skilled in the art" to be able to design and implement an application using this protocol. He must be able to understand the stated and implied requirements for security in order to have any chance of producing a secure application. And a secure application needs not just to interoperate well, but it must also refuse to interoperate insecurely, prevent impersonation, and so on.

So if we can't end up with secure applications by writing them to the RFCs, then what the hell do we write them to?

Where is this document defining all the ways in which CAs now and in the future feel free to relax the identity constraints which rely upon them to provide?

If it is not possible for a competent and conscientious software developer to write a client application from existing documentation, rely upon a set of root CAs, and end up with a countably finite and well-bounded number of private keys in existence that can impersonate legitimate servers to his application then the CA system has failed in its one and only mission.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:38PM (#5194601)
The point is that writing them to the RFC would not make them secure. The alternative to non-critical nameConstraints is no nameConstraints, which is RFC-acceptable. You're just wrong here, Marsh.
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:43PM (#5194611)
No, the alternative is no more fucking 3rd party sub-CAs under widely trusted roots.

You've fallen for the old switcheroo.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:54PM (#5194648)
Groan. Nobody gets to do anything to make HTTPS more secure until the world conforms to our norms?
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @07:07PM (#5194694)
Selling widely-trusted sub-CAs to 3rd parties, with or without name constraints, does absolutely nothing to make HTTPS more secure for me or the vast majority of relying users.

Nevertheless, if you want to sell sub-CAs with critical name constraints to 3rd parties from your widely-trusted root, fine. That's been a defined feature of PKI for a long time.

If you want to sell sub-CAs with noncritical name constraints to 3rd parties, that's fine too. Just do it from a different set of roots than the ones that we all agreed to rely upon, precisely because we had our expectations set that they would not do that sort of thing.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @07:46PM (#5194825)
Who's "we"? The people who need to agree about this --- the HTTPS cabal --- have already accepted non-critical name constraints. If you disagree with them, remove GlobalTrust from your CA store.
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:06PM (#5194903)
"We" are consumers who rely upon HTTPS to protect our $50 liability limited credit card transactions.

"We" are citizens living in repressive regimes who rely upon HTTPS to protect our emails arranging our family's emigration and escape from persecution.

"We" are software developers relying on HTTPS to secure our connections to Github to prevent attackers from inserting backdoors in our codebase.

"We" are the servers who rely upon the HTTPS client to do a thorough job of proving the absence of an active attacker on the network between us.

"We" are the relying parties.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:12PM (#5194930)
That's a rousing speech, but, again, and to a first approximation, there's only 4 organizations in the world who need to agree on TLS PKI policy. You work for one of them, don't you? Go yell at them.
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:23PM (#5194966)
Yeah I didn't mean for it to sound all rousing like that, it just came out that way.

You're probably correct in that "4 organizations in the world need to agree on TLS PKI policy", but that doesn't make it a good thing. The problem is that these N ~= 4 organizations tend to not see themselves as directly bearing the risk of a security failure in the trusted root program. The true Relying Parties are greatly underrepresented in this discussion.

I see people from many of these orgs here in this HN discussion. And, yeah, you can count on some folks getting an earful as soon as the occasion arises.

For anyone coming to RSA 2013 San Fransisco we'll be having an SSL/TLS panel discussion. This topic seems likely to come up.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by rmhrisk on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:14PM (#5194941)
I of course feel a little singled out here but as has been called out by Adam many (if not all) trusted roots have this same offering.

It is allowed by all the root programs.

The practices (both technological and procedural) we put around our program are some of the best in the industry, we take this responsibility very seriously.

More over we very rarely do it and instead work with customers to utilize our managed PKI offerings where we operate the infrastructure on behalf of the customer.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:34PM (#5195000)
many (if not all) trusted roots have this same offering

Really? Care to name names?

If this is so common, allowed, and totally above-board, why is the industry being so secretive about it?

Why won't the CA industry disclose even the number of sub-CA (constrained critically, noncritically, or not at all) private keys in possession of 3rd parties (HSMs or no)?

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by rmhrisk on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:40PM (#5195015)
Just look at the root program members in the Mozilla program, look at EFF data or the great notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/trust-tree/

As for disclosing all CAs have agreed to disclose -- no secret here at all.

And clearly from this thread I am being very open :)

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:54PM (#5195058)
Those projects show sub-CAs actually seen in public scans. They don't show all the sub-CA certs that could be used to compromise one's own security. We don't even have any idea what percentage of sub-CAs they show. For example, I doubt they show the TURKTRUST sub-CA that was used in an actual MitM of Google (and likely many others).

This is not directed specifically at you @rmhrisk, but it's really disappointing how everyone involved in PKI seems to have a systematic habit of pretending like clearly identified potential risks and vulnerabilities are equivalent to impossible until (and sometimes even after) they're actually caught being used in an actual exploit.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by rmhrisk on Saturday February 09, 2013 @09:02PM (#5195089)
Marsh, I understand your concern and I share it though I don't agree with the conclusion (re sticking head in the ground).

With that said GlobalSign has committed to implementing CT and we hope all other CAs agree to do the same as Adam points out earlier in this thread its the way to bring the desired transperancy.

That said it alone inst enough either, to start we also need TACK (and/or HSTS pinning), CAA, robust revocation checking and Name Constraints.

And while conversations like this are uncomfortable (certainly for me being on the receiving end) I think they help too.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @09:38PM (#5195183)
So are you proposing that 3rd party sub-CAs be brought under public CT?

I could get on board with that.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by rmhrisk on Saturday February 09, 2013 @09:51PM (#5195214)
I believe for CT to "work" all CAs on the public internet need to participate.

I also believe that certificate transparency by itself is insufficient and the other items I mentioned are also needed.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by ivanr on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:22PM (#5194546)
The RFC may or not matter, but what does matter is doing the right thing. For example, if critical Name Constraints are not universally supported, does that make it right to use the non-critical ones? I don't think so.

If Name Constraints are indeed important, I'd much rather see the CAB Forum first work with Apple until support is universal (or reasonably-well supported; whatever that means), and then start to use them.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:33PM (#5194579)
Careful: two different arguments here. One is what Google is doing, the other is what GlobalTrust is doing.

While I'm not alarmed by what GlobalTrust is doing, I think CA's should not be in the business of selling CA=YES certificates to other organizations. No matter what X.509 allows them to express.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by ivanr on Saturday February 09, 2013 @03:40PM (#5193916)
Let me rephrase the question: if Name Constraints are used and the extension is marked as critical (as 5280 requires), do you know (or can estimate or guess) what percentage of public users will not trust the certificate?
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by rmhrisk on Saturday February 09, 2013 @03:37PM (#5193909)
I agree with Adam, support is actually quite good in modern libraries and this is in no small thanks to the good folks at NIST who published the PKITS tests for chain engines - http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/pki/pkitest...

Many libraries built these into regression tests for their chain engines and the suite covers name constraints pretty good.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @04:55PM (#5194172)
If support is really that good, then you should have no problem following the RFC requirement that the name constraint extension be marked 'critical'.
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by rmhrisk on Saturday February 09, 2013 @05:02PM (#5194205)
Doing so right now would mean that apple users could not visit google.com or microsoft.com both of which who operate sub-cas chained to public roots.

Deploying non-critical name constraints to the existing community of subcas reduces the risk for everyone and gives apple time to fix their aged tls / certificate stack.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @05:13PM (#5194260)
So why can't Google get a cert for google.com from a trusted root CA like everybody else?

What economic benefit does it provide that outweighs the reduction in security experienced by users of Safari and countless other non-browser clients by allowing Google to be in possession of a private key that can impersonate the identities of arbitrary TLS servers?

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @05:43PM (#5194399)
If all of Google's properties were issued certs directly from Equifax rather than their own CA, the Internet security situation would change not- one- bit.

Beyond that, Google operates one of the four most important clearinghouses of Internet trust by managing the Chrome certificate policy. It's a little silly to suggest they're pulling a fast one on the Internet; if you don't trust them, you have bigger problems than nameConstraints.

Google did not create the subsidiary CA problem.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:10PM (#5194505)
Google is a terrible example for discussion here because, as you point out, they also ship a popular browser and are actively contributing positively to PKI security in several ways.

Perhaps if you were to mentally s/Google/that hospitality company customer of Trustwave/ perhaps you could see my point more clearly.

Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by tptacek on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:12PM (#5194512)
Move the goalposts around much, Marsh? You're the one bringing Google up. I agree, that was a bad rhetorical strategy.
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @06:47PM (#5194625)
I was replying to the specific scenario given by RMH "apple users could not visit google.com".

RMH chose Google. For him, it was a brilliant rhetorical strategy :-)

So who would be a good example of an organization possessing a 3rd party sub-CA for me to advance my argument? It's much harder because most of them are already relied upon in other critical ways, or are kept secret under confidentiality.

"That hospitality company issued a sub-CA by Trustwave" is the best I can come up with at the moment.