The U.S. military has a similar up-or-out policy (especially among the officer corps) and the result is (more often than not I'd say) yes men who latch onto a strong leader type and ride his coattails into a senior officer position. The result is poorly informed and advised leaders, and senior staff who spend their time figuring out if what they're doing will be approved "by the old man" instead of actually promoting the function of the organization, fight and win wars.
The key difference between up-or-out and the alternative is that, in the alternative, a certain segment of the employee base plays the politics game, and a certain segment kicks back and stagnates in the middle, while the rest try to get ahead honestly. In up-or-out, at least the third category has a decent shot. In non-up-or-out, the people trying to work hard and advance on merit will run up against the entrenched slackocracy and the political Machiavellians.
In my post, "problem" was referring to the parent post's "politics organized around moving up." My point is that most corporate cultures have elements of that focus on upward mobility. Obviously its prevalence varies from company to company. But I'd rather take a culture with an over-focus on upward mobility and potential for upward mobility than a culture with even a lesser focus on upward mobility, but less potential for it (due to all the dead weight).
I'm not holding "focus on upward mobility" equal in that assessment.
This means during prolonged periods of peacetime, a form of regulatory capture happens where the metrics used to evaluate promotion become decoupled from actual fitness of purpose.
For example, since success in academics is usually the first requirement to even start in any position above the most menial, anyone who finds it difficult to toe the line and waste hours listening to someone drone on about a topic totally unrelated to their purpose in life, or enthusiastically embrace make-work homework assignments, will likely have a hard road, no matter how well qualified they might otherwise be.
One could argue that the U.S. military in particular has had a tremendous opportunity this last decade or so to conduct exactly the kind of wartime evaluation you're talking about. But I wonder if the evaluation metrics are optimized towards peace-time?
In many respects, David Petraeus is the perfect embodiment of these political principles. He published, he politicked, he maximized his media exposure, and he hobnobbed within the right DC circles. I'm not qualified to judge whether or not he was as good a leader as many believe him to have been. But he was certainly a top-notch political operative.
(Other government agencies, e.g., the CIA, have very similar internal political incentives. The game is almost the same. This may explain, in part, the fluidity between military leadership and Agency leadership).
For the medical corps, above O-6, they usually have commanded at least one smaller facility, before they get an administrative flag assignment. More than a few have flamed-out at O-5 and O-6 commands.
In a carrier squadron, being XO or CO is preceded by being a department head. Maintenance department is a good one to get a command, but there are other departments.
The Army Medical Command had the problem with senior staff, where they were a large number of senior officers, O-8/O-9, involved in the Walter Reed scandal in 2007, were either fired or retired. Covering over issues with memos and paperwork up the chain-of-command by "yes men" didn't cut it.
If they can't, they deserve to drown themselves. If they can, they will filter out most of the fakers, and collect a team that can get stuff done in real adversial situations - since a great commander with a sucky team will suffer, and an okay commander who is able to build a great team will get whatever achievements are possible.
In the worst case scenario, a large number of people go "up" to the point where they're no longer capable of doing the job they're in and then go "out" after a brief period of doing their job badly.
These people may well have been very competent at their previous level of authority and so the business as a whole loses out.
Additionally companies which state outright this is their policy often have quotas of people who should go "out" which I've seen, in particularly talented groups, lead to an almost random selection of people going out despite the entire group being so close together in ability than no meaningful distinctions can be made.
EDIT: re jonnathanson response below, agree completely that if up can mean a person is performing solidly and achieving good results while improving year on year then such a system can be very beneficial. My criticism is much more focussed on systems where up explicitly means moving through grades, especially where there are attempts to apply quotas to who goes up and who goes out.
AKA, "The Peter Principle."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Principle --
The Peter Principle is a belief that, in an organization where promotion is based on achievement, success, and merit, that organization's members will eventually be promoted beyond their level of ability. The principle is commonly phrased, "Employees tend to rise to their level of incompetence." In more formal parlance, the effect could be stated as: employees tend to be given more authority until they cannot continue to work competently. It was formulated by Laurence J. Peter and Raymond Hull in their 1969 book The Peter Principle, a humorous[1] treatise, which also introduced the "salutary science of hierarchiology".
When the PP is active, people "rise to the level of their incompetence", and then stay there indefinitely. In Up-or-out, if you stop rising, then (after some suitable attempts to help you get unstuck) the company starts encouraging you to leave (with increasing vigour). They get the benefit of your knowledge at every level that you can operate at.
In this case, "up" means improvement more than it necessarily and literally means up the ladder.
I realize this reponse could be interpreted as a bit of a no-true-Scotsman reply, but honestly, it's intended to be a clarification of my original post.
That was their deal: you start out as Junior Developer and when you are there for 5 or so years, you can decide whether you specialize into technical stuff or people stuff. From phone calls with recruiters I had the impression this is not an unusual model.
What happens is that these firms accumulate a vast, stagnant layer of middle and upper management types who have no incentive to work any harder, take new risks, or develop talented employees. Instead, they're simply cashing in on a safe paycheck, riding a pretty cushy high horse, and fiercely fending off anyone they perceive to be competition for their sweet gigs.
Compounding this problem is the fact that mobility slows to a crawl, because the queue is full. This breeds dissatisfaction with the young, ambitious types, while simultaneously breeding resentment among the older, entrenched types who adopt the grumbly "kids these days..." defensive mentality.
Now, there are plenty of ways to screw up the up-or-out system: bad KPIs and standards, inept evaluation processes, etc. But no system is perfect, and at least a system that forces honest dialogue with managers about their future advancement prospects is better than a system wherein lousy managers can overstay their welcome.