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Re:Critical SSH Backdoor in multiple Barracuda Networks Prod... by frozenport on Thursday January 24, 2013 @02:20PM (#5111530)
If you think thats bad, why are there undocumented backdoors that don't immediately trace back to Barracuda?
Re:Critical SSH Backdoor in multiple Barracuda Networks Prod... by im3w1l on Thursday January 24, 2013 @04:02PM (#5112188)
What do you mean?
Re:Critical SSH Backdoor in multiple Barracuda Networks Prod... by dsr_ on Thursday January 24, 2013 @04:38PM (#5112408)
If you've got SSHd running on an unexpected port, you could put in a banner: "Barracuda field service access".

If you've got accounts on the system, they can have GECOS fields saying the same.

And put it in the manual. "Disabling the fieldservice account will prevent service personnel from logging in. Customers with active support contracts should not do so."

White hats tell you what they're doing and why.

Re:Critical SSH Backdoor in multiple Barracuda Networks Prod... by jrockway on Thursday January 24, 2013 @05:14PM (#5112624)
Does this add any security? Your fake sshd can also say "Barracuda field service access".
Re:Critical SSH Backdoor in multiple Barracuda Networks Prod... by lcampbell on Thursday January 24, 2013 @11:37PM (#5113990)
No, it's just to explicitly inform the customer that Barracuda has shell access to the appliance. These accounts were undocumented.
Re:Critical SSH Backdoor in multiple Barracuda Networks Prod... by dredmorbius on Friday January 25, 2013 @05:28AM (#5114850)
Reminds me of a situation I encountered at a prior gig. We were getting random log-ins to an administrative account from a user we didn't recognize. I sent email around the group asking if anyone knew what was up. Nope.

Started tracing IPs. Turned out it was coming from a gateway used by our corporate parent (very large organization). Further tracing localized it to our office.

Turned out my seatmate (who I'd included on the initial email and who had heard me muttering over this for 2 days) was the guy who had some random bozo named account that he was using for test purposes ... but had neglected to tell anyone about.

Sort of pissed me off.

One reason for documenting these backdoors is so that, if you're OK with their legitimate use, you can properly audit and account for their legitimate use. That said: given shared keys and common access, I'd be inclined to consider the device unsecurable.