> As of 2003 RSA Security claims that 1024-bit RSA keys are equivalent in strength to 80-bit symmetric keys, 2048-bit RSA keys to 112-bit symmetric keys and 3072-bit RSA keys to 128-bit symmetric keys.
-- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_size
(Although, this is almost certainly ignoring mathematical attacks, as those would make things highly variable: one could imagine a really lame cypher that doesn't effectively utilize the key, or which leaks the key into the cyphertext. The choice "Rabbit" is thereby important, and Wikipedia mentions that if you want to break a large number of keys, such as for a large number of related files/accounts on a file-storage service, and just need to break any one, a 128-bit key is only about as effective as a 96-bit one.)
> Rabbit claims 128-bit security against attackers whose target is one specific key. If, however, the attacker targets a large number of keys at once and does not really care which one he breaks, then the small IV size results in a reduced security level of 96 bit. This is due to generic TMD trade-off attacks.
In the case of Mega, the claim of 'military-grade encryption' sounds too much of snake oil as I would want to try the service. Kim Schmitz' past isn't a reason to trust him either.
In order to brute force it (and you will have to, there are no known vulnerabilities in Rabbit), you need to try up to 3.410^38 keys.
The fastest supercomputers in the world would take about 1.0210^18 years to crack 128-bit encryption.
See more on this topic (article is about AES, but the basics apply): http://www.eetimes.com/design/embedded-internet-design/43724...
"128-bit client-side Rabbit encryption"
obsolete practice? Doesn't mega use 2048? This is kind of big deal. And, of course, mega interface is a lot more than a simple "cryptolink" service. I actually feel that if mega will come up with good APIs (as well as with a client for dummies), and nobody will raid Kim for a second time, dropbox and alikes are gonna have bad times.