Re:Securing Ubuntu
by justincormack on Sunday January 20, 2013 @03:43PM
(#5088141)
It is probably better than nothing (hard to get root if everything in the chroot is running as a user, no suid files, few devices). Probably need a kernel exploit then to get out. A container is better though.
And why a chroot instead of just a dedicated user? If they can get root, it's game over anyway, isn't it?
I don't think chroot does what you think it does.
What do you think it does?
Changes the filesystem root to be inside a certain folder.
Yeah, so what's the point? If you have a separate user, you can't access other users' files anyway, unless you have root. You can access the system files, but there should be nothing of much interest in there anyway.
You should have only the minimum necessary commands and libraries in your chroot jail which minimizes the attack surface. For instance, I use chroot with rssh to only allow sFTP/scp/rsync and not allowing chroot users to get to a shell prompt.
In my chroot /usr/bin, there are only two files (rssh, scp). In my chroot /lib there are only 16 files.
Compare to:
1670 in /bin /usr/bin /sbin
50507 in /lib /usr/lib /usr/lib64
Unless some of those files are setuid root ... what does it matter? Your chroot jail is still going to have a very rich attack surface - the kernel.
I guess to prevent an application (e.g a web server running as a non root user) from easily reaching outside and running arbitrary shell commands or reading files.
For example if you have something horrible like a PHP script that does: echo system($_POST['whatever']) you at least should try and prevent it from doing "ls" and "cat" to start exploring the filesystem.
You're correct. chroot works on a per-process basis by adding a relative fs root into the process (or process table? dunno) memory. If you're root, you can change it back to /.
Re:Securing Ubuntu
by throwaway2048 on Sunday January 20, 2013 @12:52PM
(#5087536)
why not both? After chrooting use setuid()/setguid() for an individual user.
Also, last I heard chroot is not secure for sandboxing, so why bother with it at all? I'd use cgroups or even lxc containers (those are pretty well supported in the latest ubuntu).