In order for it to be completely ineffective to "treat the symptom", it rests on the assumption that successfully treating the symptom will have zero effect on the cause behind it.
A good example of that is taking pain meds to mask the pain of a knee injury. So then you go and run on it, and it makes the knee injury worse. You treated the symptom, and nothing changed.
But there are definitely examples where treating the symptom does help. For instance, someone is temporarily depressed because of a unresolved situation in their lives. And yet, they cannot address the situation because the depression is in the way. So, they take an anti-depressant, and then maybe they can resolve their root cause, and then maybe they can go off the anti-depressant.
Someone like an Ortiz, yes, is a symptom of a deeper problem. But I'm not convinced it is like the pain in a knee, where treating it will make zero difference. A bum knee isn't exacerbated by the pain. But the system may be exacerbated by Ortiz. A bum knee doesn't become a bit less bum from witnessing the taking of a pain med. But if the system recognizes an Ortiz downfall and receives a data point of what "going to far" is, then maybe that would have an effect.
Probably not a sufficient effect, probably not enough, but I'm just pointing out that the fact that Ortiz is a symptom, is not, by itself, sufficient reason to believe that "nothing will change". Also not sufficient reason to believe that the symptom should not be treated.
I'm afraid of throwing Ortiz to the wolves, washing our hands and saying, "Well, that's that."
The "common resource" is the client opportunity. The Nash equilibrium is every employee maximizing their own bonuses. The group optimum is the health of the company. It turned out that the individual self-interest did not align to what was good for the health of the companies. And in fact, that if they had cooperated and worked for the health of the companies, the employees may have ended up with higher individual payouts. This is exactly what the tragedy of the commons is about, and it's what apparently shook Greenspan to his core. So basically, it was the (predicted (over and over again)) failure of Objectivism.
I worry about the same non-effect with the gun-law blitz we're seeing after Sandy Hook. I worry that we're not attacking the problem- which may have more to do with mental health issues than gun laws.
My personal belief is that when prosecutors know that there is a chance of cases blowing up and destroying their careers, as is happening here, they have an incentive to be careful. And likely will be more careful for some time. This is a good thing - even if it helps much less than fixing the system.
That is why in many, many corporate cultures there is an effective policy of responding to problems by publicly identifying a scapegoat and throwing the book at them. It is an easy action that makes a marginal difference for a short time.
So this is better than nothing. Unfortunately it is not very good. First of all the deterrent effect is only temporary. Secondly you get two-tiered justice where defendants who seem likely to have the potential to raise such a firestorm of protest are more protected than defendants who don't. Thirdly the identification of a scapegoat relieves pressure to come up with a better fix.
Therefore I am modestly in support of the current corrective process. I would like to see something better. I will encourage better things. I know the shortcomings of scapegoating. However it is better than nothing. If this is all that this case is likely to achieve, it was still a somewhat useful response.
While Ortiz will be the convenient (and rightful, I suppose) scapegoat in this instance, she's a symptom of the problem and not the cause. There are far more fundamental problems with the DoJ, and until they're addressed (time and cost of mounting a defence, overly aggressive prosecutions, lack of oversight and discretion), nothing will change.