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Re:Linux was created as a rejection of robust software archi... by notorandit on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:44AM (#50514745)
Yes, smaller and verifiable kernels would help a lot against buggy and malicious code. Let alone stability and robustness.

Then, I for one, would not change C for anything else. The problem is not the language (which is just a tool), the problem is the coding (and the coders).

Re:Linux was created as a rejection of robust software archi... by 7373737373 on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:51AM (#50514784)
Having languages themselves be built like microkernels would help security a hell of a lot too however
Re:Linux was created as a rejection of robust software archi... by yjftsjthsd-h on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:54AM (#50514799)
> Having languages themselves be built like microkernels

What does that mean? Like... small stdlib with everything moved to extra libraries? Languages don't really have a ring 0 so I'm not sure how to read this even though it feels like a maybe-interesting take

Re:Linux was created as a rejection of robust software archi... by 7373737373 on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:09AM (#50514900)
Yeah, currently popular languages don't have any separation, internal isolation, any way to limit or monitor authority (and use of that authority) to access and use resources at all. Programs usually have full ambient authority, meaning they can just name and use resources (importing libraries, stating file paths, ...) without restrictions.

Instead, (parts of) programs should be restricted to pure computation by denying any external resource access by default, unless explicitly approved, to the minimum they need (the principle of least authority).

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E_(programming_language) or any of the languages listed here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-capability_model#Langua...

Having a microkernel OS isn't really sufficient if you want to "hollow out the attack surface", because many programs consist of hundreds of thousands of lines of code. So programs should be internally compartmentalizable as well. Only this, imported libraries being able to sandbox their imported libraries and so on recursively truly reduces the possible effects of exploits to a minimum.

Re:Linux was created as a rejection of robust software archi... by yjftsjthsd-h on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:15AM (#50514931)
Oh, you want an object-capability language; I didn't connect those dots. Yes, that would be an excellent compliment and now that you've spelled it out I can see the analogy.
Re:Linux was created as a rejection of robust software archi... by notorandit on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:30AM (#50515017)
It does not mean anything to me.
Re:Linux was created as a rejection of robust software archi... by 7373737373 on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:41AM (#50515073)
A language that can monitor and limit the effects of a program's components and isolate them against each other is strictly better than one that can't.

One example: https://hforsten.com/redefining-the-number-2-in-python.html

Add a zillion past, present and future supply chain attacks as examples too