You publicly demonize something long enough and otherwise intelligent people start believing HTTPS is an invisibility cloak or the Good Housekeeping seal of approval for the web.
1) Others knowing knowing exactly which package you are downloading could give them a very clear way to fingerprint and target services you are running
2) HTTPS could allow you to potentially reduce your risk surface in a case where there is a bug in Steam's signature checker itself and someone sends a crafted payload instead of game files. Server validation would have prevented that. This has actually happened with apt before: CVE-2019-3462.
Odds are small, but I believe in DiD. I could imagine an attacker with nothing better to do could get up to this on say, a Uni's network.
And before you come at me with I should be using a VPN to protect against these scenarios, I do that already. This is about HTTPS being a sane default when possible.
Or they could connect to the service.
> Server validation would have prevented that
No it wouldn't have. HTTPS does not ensure a server's contents are trustworthy.
> And before you come at me with I should be using a VPN to protect against these scenarios, I do that already
So you protect yourself from unlikely, irrelevant threats by... deliberately paying strangers to MiTM your traffic?
The default for package upgrades on PCs should be (and is on Ubnutu and Fedora) HTTPS as it reduces risk with minimal performance impact for most of the people.
When building update systems, while you shouldn't root your trust in PKI you should still use HTTPS to make attacks harder because even if your updates are signed there is still a lot of parsing going on before you get to the update payload. (Even better, you should use TUF to avoid reinventing insecure designs.)