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Re:Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server by tgma on Thursday November 12, 2026 @02:22AM (#50464066)
Time for a Rust based httpd replacement like https://xin.dev
Re:Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server by hnarn on Thursday November 12, 2026 @02:48AM (#50464228)
How would Rust have fixed this security issue?
Re:Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server by flossly on Thursday November 12, 2026 @02:57AM (#50464294)
They've published an article last month on the Nginx vulnerabilities in light of their Rust implementation.

https://xin.dev/blog/multiple-nginx-vulnerabilities/

Re:Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server by hnarn on Thursday November 12, 2026 @04:52AM (#50465115)
If you’re going to respond, at least make an attempt to answer the question.
Re:Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server by Xylakant on Thursday November 12, 2026 @05:16AM (#50465274)
One of the core claims of the language is data race safety because in safe rust, no memory location can be written by two or more owners at the same time. (see https://doc.rust-lang.org/nomicon/races.html for a more detailed discussion) Consequently, the kind of memory corruptions that this vulnerability seems to exploit are not possible in safe rust. Now, we don't know if a hypothetical rust-based apache implementation would have reached for unsafe in this context or done any other wild thing, but it's fair to assume that the likelihood of an exploitable RCE through memory corruption trends towards zero in programs written in Rust.
Re:Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server by Ukv on Thursday November 12, 2026 @05:18AM (#50465289)
> > a concurrent execution race condition within the assign_headers() function when handling shared resources [...] can corrupt heap memory to achieve arbitrary code execution (RCE)

To my understanding, in safe Rust to share between threads the compiler will require something like Arc<Mutex<...>> - which prevents unsynchronized access or freeing while another thread is still using it.

Re:Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server by K0nserv on Thursday November 12, 2026 @05:27AM (#50465349)
The details I've seen are too sparse to say with certainty, but it seems like the issue is concurrent access to the same value through a pointer.

In particular it's `req` in the function with this signature:

    static void assign_headers(request_rec *r, const h2_request *req,
                               int no_body, int is_connect)
The fix being:

                - apr_table_setn(req->headers, "Content-Length", "0");
                + apr_table_setn(r->headers_in, "Content-Length", "0");
My read on this is that `req` is meant to be a readonly value in this function, which is why it's marked `const`. And being readonly, it would be safe to access concurrently. However, someone accidentally wrote through this pointer.

In Rust this would've been `req: &h2_request` and the accidental write wouldn't have been possible (barring interior mutability). Even with interior mutability there is no thread interleaving during the write, which happens through a `&mut h2_request` probably obtained through a lock.

Re:Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server by flossly on Thursday November 12, 2026 @02:55AM (#50464275)
Cannot find the source... (Wanted to see if they use the RusTLS)
Re:Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server by mono442 on Thursday November 12, 2026 @05:46AM (#50465450)
this looks vibecoded which is probably even worse