Re:Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,12...
by wonnage on Saturday November 07, 2026 @06:24PM
(#50409014)
this is not a serious proposal
Re:Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,12...
by kragen on Saturday November 07, 2026 @06:31PM
(#50409048)
Not only is it a serious proposal, it's been used in practice in every airport X-ray baggage scanner for decades, where it's called Threat Image Projection (TIP): https://www.xscann.com/products-HiTipPlus.html
Re:Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,12...
by ceejayoz on Saturday November 07, 2026 @06:40PM
(#50409111)
Yes, but you can require it in such a situation, as they're subordinates who have to follow policy or lose their jobs.
Re:Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,12...
by kragen on Saturday November 07, 2026 @07:00PM
(#50409221)
As I pointed out above, Anthropic places a lot of requirements on its users already, but if Claude Code TIP were optional, presumably savvy users would turn it on voluntarily unless they wanted to use Auto Mode.
Re:Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,12...
by yunwal on Saturday November 07, 2026 @07:13PM
(#50409318)
Most of anthropic's money comes from enterprises that may want to enforce something like this at an org level.
Re:Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,12...
by DANmode on Sunday November 08, 2026 @12:08AM
(#50410556)
The same scanners that let handguns et al through 93% of the time, according to internal audits and journalist review?
Maybe pick a better comparison if so?
Re:Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,12...
by cannonpalms on Sunday November 08, 2026 @07:37AM
(#50412738)
Enterprises do the exact same thing today by sending phishing emails to their own people to figure out who needs additional training. Why would an enterprise not want this feature for Claude? It seems like an extremely serious proposal.
Speaking of really significant things being at risk, it's pretty infuriating that the web-chat Incognito mode can't write and test code locally, and neither the non-Incognito web-chat nor the local Claude Code client can be shielded from the knowledge of my email address and my geolocation. (Even the Incognito mode knows my geolocation.) This gives users no alternative but to put privacy-sensitive information at the disposal of Claude Code, which is far too unreliable to be entrusted with it. It's tempting to attribute this to Anthropic's corporate DNA valuing users' interests at a very low level, but conceivably it's just an oversight, and if I mention it here, it will be corrected in a month or two?