Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux

Re:Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux by dTal on Thursday November 05, 2026 @08:27AM (#50378816)

We keep paying ever higher architectural prices for system isolation: user accounts, memory protection, unix permissions, capabilities... and it's all for nothing, when a determined program can almost always escape its sandbox. Should we just give up and assume that all software on a machine is cooperative and non-malicious, and just do our best to make sure we don't run malware in the first place? "Defense in depth" soon slips into "don't worry too much about this layer, the next layer will catch it.

tl;dr Just run as root bro, focus on the exterior attack surface, and don't download random crap.

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Re:Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux by 0xDEAFBEAD on Thursday November 05, 2026 @09:59AM (#50379912)

[delayed]

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Re:Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux by umbra07 on Thursday November 05, 2026 @03:31PM (#50384079)

> so LLMs will refuse to decompile it.

Doesn't that just give away the entire game?

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Re:Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux by pianopatrick on Thursday November 05, 2026 @12:20PM (#50381723)

I heard a story that before there was the internet, when various defense labs with computers wanted to send data to each other they would load the data onto a drive and then send it over to the other defense lab using a truck and a couple armed Army guys.

That seems like it would still be secure. These days you could even encrypt the drive...

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Re:Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux by bombcar on Thursday November 05, 2026 @03:27PM (#50384040)

This is also from the era (and probably still true today) where it is easier as a mid-level dude in the Army to get an armed escort to another location than it is to get permission to mail something USPS.

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