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Re:eMudhra ignored Mozilla Root investigation deadline; blam... by tptacek on Friday October 23, 2026 @01:05PM (#50212166)
(1) Because it doesn't actually solve the problem. The registry operator for .COM is not historically trustworthy either.

(2) Because DNSSEC is a nightmare to deploy. Leaving the IANIX-type operational stuff aside, it doesn't work on all network paths; plenty of middleboxes freak out when they see DNS packets with DNSSEC records in them. People see this and want a best-effort system that uses DNSSEC in the majority cases where it does work, but now you have a downgradable, strippable security protocol.

(3) eMudhra is being murdered by the root programs as we speak, and when they're gone all we'll remember them for is as a WebPKI incident. The WebPKI itself will continue to function and nobody will care. That can't happen with .COM or .CO.UK or .IO; there's no accountability for those registry operators at all, let alone transparency logs to track what they're doing.

Re:eMudhra ignored Mozilla Root investigation deadline; blam... by isityettime on Friday October 23, 2026 @01:56PM (#50212913)
> plenty of middleboxes freak out when they see DNS packets with DNSSEC records in them. People see this and want a best-effort system that uses DNSSEC in the majority cases where it does work

Who? Companies whose audiences are certain kinds of corporations?

Re:eMudhra ignored Mozilla Root investigation deadline; blam... by tptacek on Friday October 23, 2026 @02:16PM (#50213220)
I've never worked in an environment where I really had to care (well, check that: at Fly.io we had to switch to tunneling WireGuard over WebSockets because UDP turns out not to be reliably deliverable) but I imagine the most common reason are company border security devices --- those devices also sometimes get deployed on places like public library wi-fi, too.
Re:eMudhra ignored Mozilla Root investigation deadline; blam... by JackSlateur on Friday October 23, 2026 @01:54PM (#50212865)
The registry operator for .com has all the privileges (regarding certificate generation) over all .com domains

As such, DANE would not add more issue here;

DNSSEC is easy to deploy (of course, you need to know your work, which is rarely the case). Legacy-first mindset is not really productive;

That's is correct, but on the other hand, incorrect: as a .com registry, I can:

  - fake the CAA records
  - fake the DCV records
  - make any CA sign any certificates
People would not even notice because, if a given website is commonly signed by LE, I can trick LE into signing a new certificate for me. The transparency logs would just show that LE signed a certificate, as usual. Again: registries have already all the power in the world (it is a good thing: not the current issue :) )
Re:eMudhra ignored Mozilla Root investigation deadline; blam... by tptacek on Friday October 23, 2026 @01:55PM (#50212888)
DNSSEC is so easy to deploy that Cloudflare had to disable it entirely for a significant chunk of all Internet traffic because... the registry operators of .DE were unable to deploy it safely.

This is more than twenty-five years after DNSSEC standardization commenced in earnest (counting from the bis protocol).

Re:eMudhra ignored Mozilla Root investigation deadline; blam... by JackSlateur on Friday October 23, 2026 @05:08PM (#50215354)
There are bozos everywhere
Re:eMudhra ignored Mozilla Root investigation deadline; blam... by pas on Friday October 23, 2026 @08:22PM (#50217139)
Germany also got so high on Putin's gas that it turned off nuclear power plants. So yes, it's not trivial to deploy, but it makes sense to do so, especially on the long term, no?
Re:eMudhra ignored Mozilla Root investigation deadline; blam... by tptacek on Friday October 23, 2026 @09:04PM (#50217430)
I think these are not really comparable observations. The point of calling out the .DE DNSSEC failure is that you'd reasonably expect the operators of a TLD to be expert at managing the DNS, and yet they failed to adequately manage DNSSEC; it speaks to the poor design of the protocol (and its associated tooling). It's not, like, a general observation about Germany itself.
Re:eMudhra ignored Mozilla Root investigation deadline; blam... by pas on Tuesday October 27, 2026 @03:37PM (#50264610)
... yet hundreds of other TLDs manage to do rollover without an incident of this magnitude.

I completely agree that the tooling is questionable, and that the protocol is meh, but in this case the monitoring noticed the problem yet humans did not notice (or get) the alert.