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Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by josephg on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @09:17AM (#50180445)
A secure DNS is valuable whether or not we get rid of CAs, since CAs rely on DNS queries to verify domain ownership.

And if we have a secure DNS, then CAs are completely redundant. I'd much rather trust a handful of domain registrars than a handful of domain registrars, plus 100 random questionably competent organisations all over the world. Especially when any one of them can generate keys for every domain on the planet.

Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by darkwater on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @09:44AM (#50180858)
It seems a nice thing to have indeed, but domain registrars have already a history to cede control and bend to $GOVERNMENT. We have countries already trying to MiTM all their citizens by mandating CAs injection in every device under their jurisdiction, what would be the defense against this threat in a world where registrars hold the keys to TLS encryption for the web on the TLDs they own as root? I'm not that expert in this field so I really would like to learn if it's possible.
Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by shiandow on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @11:34AM (#50182763)
Not that it isn't an interesting question but what's preventing them now? You can get a certificate for any domain you control. It is just really obvious if you abuse that power. Which shouldn't really change with DNSSEC I think.
Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by GoblinSlayer on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @01:28PM (#50184561)
Government can compel servers in its jurisdiction to use a mandated CA. DNS would nicely compartmentalize it to the zone controlled by that government as opposed to the CA system where every random eMudhra CA has infinite reach.
Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by darkwater on Thursday October 22, 2026 @04:23AM (#50192692)
That's true, but I still think that in a "government goes dictatorial" scenario, where for example there is already a widely usage of up to that moment perfectly safe ccTLD websites and services, they could MITM all of them more easily just going to a single place, and doing it in a manner more difficult to uncover.

Although I'm not sure where a specific domain private keys would be hold in DNS in this case, and that could make my point moot.

Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by darkwater on Thursday October 22, 2026 @06:24AM (#50193485)
Example: an green-haired guy is elected President of Zootopia [1] but not all the State branches are still under his power, but he can force the .zoo registrar to release all their private keys so it can siphon all the encrypted data going back and forth .zoo domains that are used by other State branches, and blackmail them or find out how they are organizing.

[1] yeah I know it's a city in reality

Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by tptacek on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @01:25PM (#50184527)
"Secure" doesn't mean anything. A closer (though still imprecise) descriptor is the CIA triad --- confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

A confidential DNS has real value. Without it, ISPs actively monitor customers and sell analytics about usage upstream; there are other problems, but virtually every US user faces that one. It's hard to imagine wanting to trade confidentiality off.

A high-integrity DNS is a more dubious proposition. You'd obviously rather have integrity than not, ceteris paribus, but we have effective mitigating controls for DNS forgery, so you might imagine trading it off.

Availability also sounds like a no-brainer, until you remember that almost every other component of the networking stack also has availability issues. You might not want to trade anything at all to get a more highly-available DNS, if you're going to be just as susceptible to DOS attacks because the current DDoS meta is application-layer anyways.

There are a bunch of different approaches to securing the DNS, and they make different tradeoffs.

DoH focuses on confidentiality, and has bank-shot benefits to integrity (because it breaks forgery attacks from on-path attackers). Confidentiality is its primary purpose and it trades basically everything else off.

DNSSEC makes the opposite tradeoffs: it's exclusively for integrity, provides no confidentiality, and highly prioritizes availability (that's why it has elaborate authenticated denial systems).

Depending on what you want to achieve, "secure" DNS can make sense and actually get deployed and used, as DoH is, or it can make almost no sense and see almost no uptake.

Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by GoblinSlayer on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @02:27PM (#50185392)
Security provided by CAs is TLS Web Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1). CAs too are exclusively for integrity, provide no confidentiality and don't prioritize availability.
Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by InsidiousWombat on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @05:58PM (#50188233)
DoH was mostly forced by few companies, it doesn't solve any real problems because the places that would like to spy on your DNS can just block few DoH providers that are used by default. Like, it's nice to have that random MITM can't see your DNS but if ISP wants it, they can just block it.
Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by tptacek on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @06:21PM (#50188481)
This mostly describes the difference between DoT (which is trivial to block) and DoH (which is deliberately harder to block). Are you aware of any ISP blocking DoH?
Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by InsidiousWombat on Thursday October 22, 2026 @09:00PM (#50203223)
https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/295 China for example ?

It's just few IPs on a known port. It's trivial to block.

now if the cloud providers ran it on every of their internet facing load balancers so you could use any of their IPs for DNS maybe it would be more effective, but as it is, it is entirely trivial to block it.

We actually did it for corporate network for entirely different reason, we just have a bunch of internal-only DNS zones and want browser to use that.

Re:Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in millise... by tptacek on Thursday October 22, 2026 @09:31PM (#50203458)
The whole point of DoH is that the "known port" is the encrypted one the whole Internet runs over (443/tcp), which makes it more difficult to block than DoT.