When symbolic algorithms are that large, they're equally hard to reason with most of the time. The upshot would be a lot more storage required in exchange for more generalized computing, lessening the need for so much GPU in a lot of cases.
I don't see why a model couldn't be represented that way. After all, if you just polled the output of a model, you could evolve genetic algorithms to predict it with fairly high accuracy in a limited domain. Take that out to the Nth degree and you're basically just unspooling the model into a giant set of equations.
The hope would be that this unlocks some substantially more efficient or parsimonious math that would fit better on a chip. And that’s clearly my words, not the authors’, per the comment above.
I'd imagine that our brains have become similarly biased towards generating such a generalised symbolic structure over hundreds of millions of years of evolution?
I'm thinking how certain regions of the brain reliably represent things like motor skills, speech, abstract thought.
That in itself is of course not super useful for tasks that we don't already know to do symbolically, but it's nice to see that they can manipulate the keys and values of their representation somewhat independently. So at least some of what LLMs do internally seems to involve a bit more structure than just linear combinations of some overcomplete dictionary.
The interesting question is whether this can be used to interpret the operation of a single layer by lifting it to operate on key-value stores instead, replacing matrix-vector products with reading from some keys and then writing to others. That could potentially move the balance of power more towards CPU inference instead of GPUs.
Well that's good to hear. Would have been rather exasperating to find out we could have somehow gotten Fable or Sol out of sufficiently advanced sparse-coding ages ago.
> "Second, there is no guarantee that a given neural network can be approximated by DISCOVER"
Page 7.They train what appears as embeddings for outer product of roles and fillers. The role for language model can be a position in text, the filler can be an embedding of a word at that position. Then that matrix of a sum of these outer products is linearly mapped into NN encodings and then decoded by NN decoder.
The embeddings learned by this process are not necessarily smaller than original ones. Given that they participate in an outer product computation gives me impression that the resulting sum is much bigger than actual NN encoding, that is why it needs to be linearly mapped into NN encoding.
So, this paper will not necessarily lead to any computation savings.
But I am at page 6. ;)
No it is way worse since computationally they are same things with symbolic having overhead of attending to the symbols.
(1) they are claiming to produce apparently bijective closed-form symbolic representations/approximations of, among other things, LLMs. Is evaluating these closed-form representations more computationally efficient? The implications of that are potentially huge. It would be essentially analytic distillation. Fable on a chip and not a data center would be important — and disruptive - in many ways.
(2) Unsupervised, and even supervised, symbolic approaches to problem solving break down due to combinatorial explosion, among other things. This could potentially allow us to treat LLM training and inference as a search algorithm for novel symbolic approaches to solving new classes of complex problems hitherto unreachable through other approaches. If that works, I suspect it’s a feedback loop, too - the learnings from one representation push advances in the other. This would also increase the economic value of large training runs, since the model itself is now valuable, not just its inference.
(3) Per the above, can this push LLM design to greater capabilities?
The relationship between this and Anthropic’s J-space observation is also interesting. This is much, much deeper and more directly actionable, though.
EDIT: I ran my questions through Sonnet — yes, I appreciate the irony — and it was none too sanguine about questions (1) and (2), but thought (3) was reasonable. In any case, this is quite the paper. On reflection, I do think that the apparent reliance on very simple symbolic representations and tasks is underwhelming. But the approach is impressive. And obviously this is still early days, and the value of building a bridge between the very fuzzy LLM models and the rigorous, mechanically provable models would be enormous.