Re:SeL4 security proofs now complete on AArch64
by brohee on Monday August 24, 2026 @11:37AM
(#49421298)
I don't think you can ignore memory access. The whole "hyperthreading considered harmful" was because of shared cache between contexts. That's why I think a proof is in reach without cache, much harder with one...
Re:SeL4 security proofs now complete on AArch64
by Someone on Tuesday August 25, 2026 @11:37AM
(#49435943)
Without cache, without virtual memory, without throttling when the more hardware is switched on or the CPU gets hot, without memory that’s unreliable under load (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer), etc.
Re:SeL4 security proofs now complete on AArch64
by rivetfasten on Tuesday August 25, 2026 @09:00AM
(#49433281)
That works fine for some crypto algorithms, but as stated in the paper not for everything.
As I understand it, this proof needs to support conditionals for example.
1. Some known set of architectures, with
2. Some known set of (constant time/variable time) operations
And then prove things about programs written against those architectures. See for example
https://github.com/PLSysSec/FaCT
That being said, practically the operations that are variable time are known, and are mostly* the same on all modern architectures. In particular
1. Branching on a secret-dependent variable, or
2. Indexing an array with a secret-dependent index, or
3. Some architecture specific operations (typically things like division, occasionally things like multiplications/shifting).