Pan-psychists might argue that your subjective consciousness is an aggregate of all the cells/molecules, etc in the system
"While each biological cell operates largely on its own chemical cues, they all coordinate through complex nervous and chemical networks to create your unified, subjective experience."
You might be a rigid materialist
There's definitely research and scholarship that would beg to disagree with you there. At least in terms of completely writing off the notion of "agency" when it comes to cells.
Dr. Michael Levin's lab is doing some pretty cool work. https://drmichaellevin.org/
Yes? Literally no machine ever built by humans is capable of (or even hinting at beginnings of capability for) replication or novel synthesis like cells are, let alone autonomously, it’s quite unconceivable that anyone would take this to be a reasonable assumption in the first place.
The ball is in your camp to provide solid reasons to believe why they should be grouped together, when one is a deeply complex interrelated dynamic system (in fact, arguably the most complex system we know of) evolved bottom up over billions of years that we only very partially understand and cannot fully explain or document, and the other something entirely planned, designed, and produced by humans in which every component is finite and accounted for.
The argument boils down to “well the vibes kind of match to my taste, and it’s the best analogy I have in my analogy toolkit”, which is just not serious reasoning.
In your view, can machines even exist that haven’t been created by people, definitionally? I, personally, don’t see the relevance of intent but that seems to be the only distinguishing factor here.
autonomous replication: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_worm
nb that writing your own quine remains in general terms a fun and challenging exercise in many programming languages, but not python.
Otherwise you’re just arguing that Sims are totally alive because Sims can make baby Sims.
Anyway, seems like an argument over said definitions rather than the underlying characteristics. The relevant question is whether they're purely physical objects behaving according to rules, which is being described as "machine," or whether there is something beyond that. Current understanding is contradictory: all indications are that cells and bodies are purely physical objects, except that there is this phenomenon of subjective experience which doesn't fit with that at all.
We have this definition from the history of western languages, the history of western philosophy, and works by Lewis Mumford and Franz Reuleaux, among others authors.
> The relevant question is whether they're purely physical objects behaving according to rules, which is being described as "machine," or whether there is something beyond that. Current understanding is contradictory: all indications are that cells and bodies are purely physical objects, except that there is this phenomenon of subjective experience which doesn't fit with that at all.
Then you would say that you dog broke (died), or that the vet fixed your cat (cured). Which by all means we might speak that way, but surely you would notice that it is not accurate.
Saying that a living organism is just a machine because it is a physical object behaving according to rules is like saying that a beautifully built house is just a bunch of bricks layed in rows and something on top.
But assuming that we say 'purely physical objects behaving according to rules' are machines, then:
1) there is no difference between you, your dog, your fridge and the snail in you garden 2) It would be semantically valid in all languages to say 'my dog broke' instead of it died, 'i got fixed' instead of 'the doctor cured me' 3) Machines vary in complexity and we would still have 'degrees of complexity' regarding machines (human bodies being the most complex, perhaps, toasters being fairly simple), but fundamentally, all of them would follow the same rules for 'fixing', 'breaking' and 'repairing'. Which is not the case. 4) You would have to come up with some kind of theology regarding how we were built. There is no evidence that we have been 'built', quite the contrary.
And most probably there are quite more reasons not to regard machines as living organisms nor living organisms as machines.
[0] where I assume you mean rules = "laws of physics", because if we were to choose the more conventional definition of rule = "an accepted principle or instruction that states the way things are or should be done", then your own definition doesn't apply to cells or other biological entities
> ... if the mind is an emergent phenomenon from machines (cells) then it seems quite likely that a mind could emerge from other, different machines. Since cells cannot be defined as machines, the argument about mind emerging from machines does not hold.
Do you disagree with the assumption that cells are machines? They seem pretty machine-like to me. I certainly don’t think individual cells have any subjective experience or sense of agency. I would be curious to know where your intuitions diverge here, because if the mind is an emergent phenomenon from machines (cells) then it seems quite likely that a mind could emerge from other, different machines.