Re:Rootshell: A new E2EE email service hosted in Iceland
by charcircuit on Wednesday June 03, 2026 @07:12PM
(#48391367)
Wouldn't the better guidance be to use different domain for official communication similar to sites where you can customize the subdomain? Attackers can always come up with something you didn't think to block.
Google doesn't let just anyone make a mail on the google.com domain for example.
Re:Rootshell: A new E2EE email service hosted in Iceland
by mike-cardwell on Thursday June 04, 2026 @07:43AM
(#48397272)
That wouldn't be better guidance. That would be additional guidance. I'm sure Google also never let anybody set up [email protected]
Re:Rootshell: A new E2EE email service hosted in Iceland
by sc0rt on Wednesday June 03, 2026 @06:59PM
(#48391262)
I found the guy on X, wasn't that hard: https://x.com/haptagod
You should probably hit him up and tell him these things?
Re:Rootshell: A new E2EE email service hosted in Iceland
by mike-cardwell on Thursday June 04, 2026 @07:45AM
(#48397285)
I don't use X. You can tell him if you want.
Re:Rootshell: A new E2EE email service hosted in Iceland
by jszymborski on Wednesday June 03, 2026 @06:43PM
(#48391125)
I hate shoving LLMs everywhere, but honestly this is probably a good use case for tiny models like the 0.6B Qwen model to flag account names for human review.
Re:Rootshell: A new E2EE email service hosted in Iceland
by rho138 on Wednesday June 03, 2026 @07:47PM
(#48391712)
Or just read the RFCs tbh. I keep them indexed locally as text, it’s super useful for finding random garbage that may not pop up from a search.
Re:Rootshell: A new E2EE email service hosted in Iceland
by jszymborski on Wednesday June 03, 2026 @08:12PM
(#48391953)
There's a lot of stuff that looks officious enough that will trick folks, especially those distracted or not well-versed in the attack vector.
RFC 2142 mailbox names (the core list):
postmaster@ — required by RFC 5321; mail systems expect it to always work abuse@ — for reporting spam/misuse hostmaster@ — DNS issues webmaster@ — website issues noc@ — network operations security@ — security/vulnerability reports info@, marketing@, sales@, support@ — business functions
TLS/certificate validation addresses (RFC 8552 / CA-Browser Forum):
admin@, administrator@ ssladmin@, ssladministrator@, sysadmin@ These can be used to validate domain control and issue certificates, so handing them to a random user is a real security risk.
Common automated/system senders people impersonate or that cause confusion:
noreply@, no-reply@, donotreply@ mailer-daemon@ — bounce messages (RFC 5321 sender) root@, daemon@, bin@, sys@ — Unix-style system accounts null@, devnull@
Brand/trust-sensitive ones worth blocking too:
billing@, accounts@, payments@ help@, contact@, service@ legal@, privacy@, dmca@ register@, registration@, signup@ The service's own name (e.g. [brand]@, team@, staff@, official@)
[edit] Re the TLS issue. You should set up a CAA DNS record and also check on crt.sh later to see if anybody managed to get a cert for rootshell.is if you didn't lock down the validation addresses