Re:Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise
by fragmede on Tuesday May 12, 2026 @03:50AM
(#48105425)
Could link it to a yubikey via pam.d so you need a fingerpress to authenticate.
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Re:Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise
by pastage on Tuesday May 12, 2026 @04:22AM
(#48105629)
Physical attestations are hard to solve, I think it would be nice if all TPMs in laptops had this. Then the problem becomes how do you automate stuff that needs to be done.
Re:Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise
by lrvick on Tuesday May 12, 2026 @04:40AM
(#48105744)
And then the moment you authenticate, the fake sudo still executes its payload.
Yubikeys do not fix this issue.
Re:Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise
by exyi on Tuesday May 12, 2026 @11:55AM
(#48110096)
At least my password won't leak as often with yubikey, but the attacker can still hack my shell to execute fake sudo. Even if I type /bin/sudo explicitly, there is ptrace, LD_PRELOAD or just replacing the entire bash binary.
In practice yubikey sudo keeps you much safer today, as almost nobody uses it and malware won't be prepared for it