I think, as I understand it, the objection is this. The proposition that infinity is "real", and there are actually infinite (not just very many) things.
As far as I can tell, numbers aren't real either. "Twelve" isn't a thing that exists in itself in the physical universe, it's an abstraction over some features of reality.
"Infinity" is another abstraction, but it's not the same kind of abstraction as "Twelve". It's a further step.
All mathematics is abstractions, layered on each other. See also "God created the integers, all else is the work of man"
"there are infinite stars" does not meaningfully describe reality. For a number of reasons, not least of which would be how we would verify that - we cannot count the stars if they are infinite because we would need an infinite amount of time to do it. We can't shortcut this process, either, any method of counting stars that allowed us to count more stars more quickly would still run into the problem that it would take infinite time to count them.
We can never know if something "real" is actually infinite, or if it's just very large. But disallowing infinities from our concept of the universe does do cool things; we no longer get the endless "in an infinite universe, everything possible must happen an infinite number of times, so therefore <this ridiculous thing> must be happening" arguments. The universe is not infinite, or if it is infinite we cannot measure that or confirm it, so <ridiculous thing> isn't happening unless probability says it will happen in a merely very large universe.
You can, but are there? Is the space bar grouped with them? You can decide either way, and either choice is defensible, so the count is dependant on our human categories.
Each key is unique, with the printed letter and with the precise arrangement of atoms differing. None of them are interchangeable. So you could decide that each key is in their own category. Or you could throw them in a bag with some dice and pebbles too and count the objects. Numbers are regarded as interchangeable, one "102" is the same as any other "102". Physical objects are not.
That's what I mean by saying that counting is an abstraction, and a number isn't a thing that exists in itself in the physical universe - it only occurs not "in itself", but once we can subjectively group things. There are "twelve keys" if you decide to group them as the same thing though they're actually not really. There's no physically existent "twelve".
I fully agree that "infinity" is a different kind of concept, less physically relatable even than "102". It's a further abstraction.
If you want to do things with infinity, fine, but then do it properly and write things like lim x->inf (your expression with x here)
Not really. There are infinitely many infinities. Infinite numbers are not particularly more special than real numbers, complex numbers, matrices, functions/operators, etc.
Complex numbers do too (e.g. there is no ordering). But at least that doesn't cause as much confusion as some of the problems with infinite numbers.
Lots of numbers have special meanings. The ancients didn't think 1 was a number, and later lots of people didn't (and some still don't) think 0 was a number.
You can have gripes over whether or not pure math is compatible with the physical world but we're not exactly close to solving that problem... if we were, then physicists would have a much easier time lol
Suppose we start with ZFC - Infinity as our base system. Then the negation of Infinity is consistent with this system. But adding Infinity itself makes the system strictly stronger, since ZFC proves the consistency of ZFC - Inf: in particular, in ZFC, we cannot prove that Infinity is consistent with ZFC - Inf.
In other words, in principle, it might be the case that ZFC - Inf is consistent, yet ZFC itself has a contradiction. In practice, most people believe that ZFC is also consistent, but we have no way to prove it a priori without accepting even more new axioms.
I say do whatever math you like. It is helpful to know what math you are doing. For instance, while I don't have a "problem" with the Axiom of Choice per se I do like clean specifications of when we are using it and when we are not, because it is another example of when we detach from reality as we know it. I don't have a problem with detaching from reality as we know it, I just like there to be awareness that we have.
But plenty of math is detached from reality. Honestly we don't observe very many "mathematical entities" at all; I've never seen a graph. I've never seen hyperbolic space. I'm aware of the many places aspects of them seem to map to reality, but I've never actually seen a literal graph in the real world.
Personally I am reminded of the way that we model our computers with Turing Complete formalisms, despite the fact they are observably not Turing Complete and are technically just finite state machines. However, the observation that they are "just" finite state machines doesn't move us closer to an understanding of how our computers work, it moves us farther away. Even though computers are completely real-world phenomena, if you want to understand the issues raised by things like Turing Incompleteness and other such things in the real world, you're going to be exponentially better off using Turing Machine formalisms and simply noting that you may run out of memory or practically-available computational resources before a calculation can complete than trying to build a new set of formalisms around finite state machines. We can be in an engineering context where we are well aware of the finite nature of everything we are doing because it all comes back to real, physical machines, but it's still easier to model with infinity than without it.
In that context, the real utility of "infinity" is less "an infinite number of things" than "you will never reach for another X [byte of RAM, byte of disk, CPU cycle, incrementing counter, etc.] and be told you're out of resources". Basically we write our proofs, formal or informal, as ignoring "what if I reach for this resource and it's not there?" for every such resource and every time we reach for a resource, which is quite often. You could go through a system and add a "what if" check for every such instance, but it's way cheaper to just buy another stick of RAM or tweak the program to take fewer resources than it is to try to deal with the exponential-with-a-large-exponent explosion of states this causes mathematically.
It's a fun thinking prompt, and you can go down the rabbit hole of information theory and quantized spacetime. Like you suggest, it's perfectly fine to say "infinity does not exist" and also contemplate and operate on slice at a time.
This is alluded to in the article; it's challenging to prove a+b=b+a without infinity (though if you do modular/wraparound arithmetic it becomes straightforward).
It seems to me (not an expert in this area by a long stretch) that ultrafinite mathematics could basically be a branch of theoretical computer science in the sense that people seem interested in procedures to generate the numbers. In this regard, it's a bit surprising that TCS wasn't mentioned in the article.
The vast, vast majority of mathematics DOES use infinities. That's the standard perspective. The question is whether there is good, interesting, useful mathematics to be explored by disallowing that concept.
The way I see it, Gödel's, Turing's work and complexity theory come out of this line of thinking about _effective_ computation. This is an argument for exploring the mathematics that arises when you don't think of actual computer math as an imperfect approximation of the real numbers, but rather as a mathematical object in its own right.
I would guess (?) it's more interesting for floating point math and related than for integer math, because for integer math it's already well explored in group theory.
You can idealise it like many things in mathematics, but implementation details fail compared to the abstract ideals.
Formalism is a very common approach in the philosophy of mathematics-but it isn’t the only one, and it is not the philosophy which motivates ultrafinitism.
Another viewpoint is that mathematical objects somehow really exist; mathematics is more than just a symbol manipulation game. One variation of this is (mathematical) Platonism, which believes they exist in some timeless realm beyond this physical universe; that view has no issue with infinities either, since adherents of this view generally believe that realm to be infinite and filled with infinities.
Yet another view is conceptualism-mathematical objects really exist, but in the human mind. And this is the viewpoint that motivates ultrafinitism - the human mind is finite, so infinite mathematical objects cannot really exist in it, or at least not in the fullness of the sense that finite objects can; and that turns out to be true, not just for infinities, but also for overly large finitudes.
This idea that some mathematical objects are in a philosophical sense “more real” than others is a big motivator of mathematical constructivism-trying to find axioms which respect that philosophical distinction, and work out what the consequences of those axioms are. Ultrafinitism is just a particularly extreme form of constructivism, which adopted a stricter “criterion of reality” for mathematical objects than most constructivists do
Setting that aside, it's very difficult for me to take non-formalist views of mathematics seriously. I strongly suspect that anyone who subscribes to those views has some deep-seated confusion in their heads.
> Platonism, which believes [mathematical objects] exist in some timeless realm beyond this physical universe
This is equivalent to formalism, except perhaps in how the mathematician feels about it. What could any possible difference be? In what way could it ever matter in the slightest whether something "really exists", if we define that to be so weak as to include "in some timeless realm beyond this universe"? Surely pink goblins "really exist" in this sense as well. With such a weak definition, the difference between your "really exists" and my "really exists" is purely emotional.
> Yet another view is conceptualism-mathematical objects really exist, but in the human mind.
You can be formalist and still argue about whether humans invented or discovered math. Beyond that, this is again just relying on the weakest possible definition of "really exists", with some added human-centric arrogance added in. Crows can count to 5; it's patently absurd to claim they are using something that is "not mathematics" or some completely alien form of mathematics that humans cannot access, because it's crow-brain math rather than human-brain math. This sounds like the Copenhangen Interpretation but for math: humans brains are magic! What are we doing? What are we talking about?
> This idea that some mathematical objects are in a philosophical sense “more real” than others is a big motivator of mathematical constructivism
Yet again, this is still formalism. Up until here, you've used the word "real" in such a weak tautological sense as to have no connection to our (or any possible) universe. But here, you've switched back to "real" meaning "having any bearing on our universe". So you're saying "constructivists consider different axioms useful than ZFC mathematicians do." More often they don't even really think about usefuless at all, it's just something that caught their interest and they decided to explore it.
There simply is no "non-formalist" mathematics.
I think you're misinterpreting what I was saying. Of course, a formalist will say that some rules are "more valid" in the sense that they produce more interesting or useful theorems. My point was, to a formalist, there is nothing more to be said about the validity of axioms than the value of the theorems they produce. Whereas, from certain other perspectives in the philosophy of mathematics, that is not the only grounds on which axioms can be judged.
> This is equivalent to formalism, except perhaps in how the mathematician feels about it. What could any possible difference be? In what way could it ever matter in the slightest whether something "really exists", if we define that to be so weak as to include "in some timeless realm beyond this universe"? Surely pink goblins "really exist" in this sense as well. With such a weak definition, the difference between your "really exists" and my "really exists" is purely emotional.
You sound like a logical positivist. And that's the issue – if your philosophical assumptions are positivist, then non-positivist philosophies of mathematics (and of anything else) simply aren't going to be intelligible to you. They can only make sense if you are at least willing to doubt for a moment your positivist assumptions.
> Crows can count to 5; it's patently absurd to claim they are using something that is "not mathematics" or some completely alien form of mathematics that humans cannot access, because it's crow-brain math rather than human-brain math. This sounds like the Copenhangen Interpretation but for math: humans brains are magic! What are we doing? What are we talking about?
Conceptualism claims that mathematics exists in the mind–but it doesn't claim necessarily only human minds. If animals have minds too, then mathematics can exist in animal minds as well, even if in a much more rudimentary form. I doubt any conceptualist would say, that if intelligent extraterrestrial life were discovered to exist, that their minds wouldn't contain mathematics simply because they are a different species from homo sapiens.
> So you're saying "constructivists consider different axioms useful than ZFC mathematicians do." More often they don't even really think about usefuless at all, it's just something that caught their interest and they decided to explore it.
There are different types of constructivists: (a) those who have a philosophical commitment to constructivism; (b) those who are interested in constructivism for practical reasons (related to computer science); (c) those who are just interested in it as an interesting mathematical system to explore. You can be (b) or (c) without needing any philosophical commitments at all, and they are completely compatible with a formalist philosophy of mathematics. And, quite possibly, the majority working in constructive mathematics today are (b) or (c) not (a). But, historically, the founders of constructive mathematics (e.g. Brouwer) were very much (a) not (b) or (c).
> There simply is no "non-formalist" mathematics.
I think you are conflating mathematics with the philosophy of mathematics – they are two distinct disciplines. Disagreements about the philosophy of mathematics make no direct difference to mathematics itself; at the margins, they can influence judgements about which problems are interesting – although, even there, a person can find ultrafinitist mathematics interesting without needing any philosophical commitment to an ultrafinitist philosophy of mathematics.
Certainly you can build a branch of mathematics without an axiom of infinity, and that’s fine, it’s math over finite sets.
However, an axiom of infinity is independent, it doesn’t contradict anything in standard formalizations, and so it doesn’t make sense to say “infinity is wrong”.
He may think the axiom of infinity isn’t satisfied by our real physical world, but that’s not a math question! There’s nothing logically inconsistent about infinite sets nor their axiomatizations.