With a non-profit project of highly principled security experts, there is at least a high probability that they'd rather blow up the project than compromise. People elsewhere in the thread criticize Micay because he deleted the CopperheadOS keys, but to me it increases trust in the GrapheneOS project, since he clearly puts the security of his users over money, fear, and whatnot.
In the end trust arises from running a project or company long-term without evidence that you somehow compromised security.
I wonder in general how this situation could be improved. Second or third independent reproducible build + confirmation signing?
The project is not going to relinquish control to any 3rd party. Not even the Motorola partnership is given control over the GOS project. The hypothetical you describe is not possible by design.
The GOS project takes no issue with critical thinking, and encourages it. But that is often used as an excuse to handwave attacks. There is a very big difference between criticism/critical thinking and attacking them.
Note that there are more individuals in the project than Micay. Multiple people handle multiple responsibilities, its not one person.
Responding to attacks so defensively is almost alway a bad look for organizations. They could really use a PR person with a more measured voice that corrects facts and projects confidence, and does not convey victimhood, insecurity or defensiveness. Take a look at the tone of press releases issued by companies when some tech press bozo writes a hit piece on them, for good examples of dealing with people attacking you.
Is there an authoritative source of information about how a takeover like that isn't possible by design, which people can verify, analyze, hold parties accountable for the pieces that require it, etc.?
As for how such a thing would not be possible;
-GrapheneOS updates do not trust the network, so any compromise of update servers for OS and app updates would not be able to push malicious updates. Only those who hold the signing keys are capable of pushing updates that will be accepted.
-Multiple people review the code that gets included in the OS. There is not one point of failure when it comes to social engineering.
-GOS supports reproducible builds, so the code that is published can be verified to be the code that is built for the official builds.
So in other words, you would need to convince multiple people who are consciously protecting against this, and who have a proven track record of burning the keys if the privacy and security of their users are in jeopardy. On top of that, you need to conceal this from every developer, moderator, and community member who would raise the alarm at the slightest indication of compromise.
https://recapio.com/digest/grapheneos-documenting-numerous-a...
You're not doing either project any favors by pretending that hastily generalizing nerd dramas and autism over-corrections is somehow a broad statement on the neutrality and objectivity of GrapheneOS's team or the high-quality product it produces.
This kind of bad faith posting is bad for the whole FOSS/libre community, and it's both dumb and rude, in contradiction of HN's site guidelines.
Let me tell you something. I personally reached out to them just a few weeks ago. I didn't argue, I didn't blame them. That was not my intention and I communicated that clearly. Those were not empty words, I went into it with a genuine open mind and with the goal of finding a solution. After all they consider themselves an open source enthusiast.
It didn't go anywhere. They did not seem willing to discuss anything at all really. You see, even if we assume they are 100% in the right, i.e. they did nothing wrong, why would they oppose our attempt at resolving the conflict? I've come to the conclusion there is no good faith argument to be made here. They spread their post all over the internet, heck they even linked it on Facebook.
At least some of the defensiveness is warranted. Maybe most of it. Regardless, it comes across in most GrapheneOS communications, and it's sometimes counterproductive.
A related issue, which I'm sure Micay can appreciate, is that users of GrapheneOS tend to be cautious, and increasingly will want to know why the project should be trusted, now that it is popular and on a lot of radars of adversaries.
(For example, hypothetical scenario that's plausible, given the incentives: State actor (e.g., RU, US, CN) or organized crime group long-con starts with a public harassment campaign of Micay. Followed by sleeper volunteers taking more control of the project, initially under the pretext of helping insulate Micay from harassment, and taking some of the load off. Later maybe even impersonating Micay. Now the threat actor has backdoors to a large number of especially privacy/security-conscious parties, including communications, 2FA, location, cryptocurrency wallets, internal networks where those people work, etc.)
I think it probably hasn't been compromised like that, but it's an obvious real possibility, and IMHO, until GrapheneOS is more transparent, some natural users of GrapheneOS are going to consider iPhone relatively "the devil you know".
Again, I think Micay is genuine, and I'm a fan of the project and appreciate it. And I hope the project understands that's compatible with critical thinking about infosec, and doesn't take personal offense at that.
(Source: Am long-time GrapheneOS user, and have donated.)