Maybe I misunderstood this point. But the ssh socket also gives access to your private keys, so I see no security gain in that point. Better to have a password protected key.
As a higher-level alternative to bwrap, I sometimes use `flatpak run --filesystem=$PWD --command=bash org.freedesktop.Platform`. This is kind of an abuse of flatpaks but works just fine to make a sandbox. And unlike bwrap, it has sane defaults (no extra permissions, not even network, though it does allow xdg-desktop-portal).
To be honest - and I can't really believe I'm saying it - what I really want is something more like Android permissions. (Except more granular file permissions, which Android doesn't do at all well.) Like: start with nothing, app is requesting x access, allow it this time; oh alright fine always allow it. Central place to manage it later. Etc.
Rest was all written by me.
Unlike other criticisms of the project, this one feels personal as it is objectively incorrect.
I have bwrap configured to override: npm, pip, cargo, mvn, gradle, everything you can think of and I only give it the access it needs, strip anything that is useless to it anyway, deny dbus, sockets, everything. SSH is forwarded via socket (ssh-add).
This limits the blast radius to your CWD and package manager caches and often won't even work since the malware usually expects some things to be available which are not in a permissionless sandbox.
You can think of it as running a docker container, but without the requirement of having to have an image. It is the same thing flatpak is based on.
As for server deployments, container hardening is your friend. Most supply chain attacks target build scripts so as long as you treat your CI/CD as an untrusted environment you should be good - there's quite a few resources on this so won't go into detail.
Bonus points: use the same sandbox for AI.
Stay safe out there.