Re:LiteLLM Python package compromised by supply-chain attack
by 1313ed01 on Tuesday March 24, 2026 @11:02AM
(#47503679)
Sure, and that is basically what sane people do now, but that only works until something needs a security patch that was not provided for the old version, and changing one dependency is likely to cascade so now I am open to supply chain attacks in many dependencies again (even if briefly).
To really run code without trust would need something more like a microkernel that is the only thing in my system I have to trust, and everything running on top of that is forced to behave and isolated from everything else. Ideally a kernel so small and popular and rarely modified that it can be well tested and trusted.
Re:LiteLLM Python package compromised by supply-chain attack
by dist-epoch on Tuesday March 24, 2026 @11:53AM
(#47504538)
Virtual machines are that - tiny surfaces to access the host system (block disk device, ...). Which is why virtual machine escape vulnerabilities are quite rare.
Re:LiteLLM Python package compromised by supply-chain attack
by bilbo0s on Tuesday March 24, 2026 @03:54PM
(#47508153)
I feel like in some cases we should be using virtual machines. Especially in domains where risk is non-trivial.
How do you change developer and user habits though? It's not as easy as people think.
Don't just update every time the dependency project updates. Update specifically for security issues, new features, and specific performance benefits. And even then avoid the latest version when possible.