Bayesian supporters often like to say they are just using more information by coding them in priors, but if they had data to support their priors, they are frequentists.
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Dear ChatGPT, are there priors in frequentist statistics? (Please answer with a single sentence.)
No — unlike Bayesian statistics, frequentist statistics do not use priors, as they treat parameters as fixed and rely solely on the likelihood derived from the observed data.
Second, I think the nod to robust methods is what’s often called regularization in frequentist statistics. There are cases where regularization and priors lead to the same methodology (cf L1 regularized fits and exponential priors) but the interpretation of the results is different. Bayesian claim they get stronger results but that’s because they make what are ultimately unjustified assumptions. My point is that if they were fully justified, they have to use frequentist methods.
You may do a Bayesian calculation that looks similar to a frequentist calculation but it will be conceptually different. The result is not really comparable: a frequentist confidence interval and a Bayesian credible interval are completely different things even if the numerical values of the limits coincide.
Point distribution <=> point estimate as a sample from an initially flat distribution. A priori vs a posteriori perspectives, which are equivocal if we are to take your description of frequentist statistics into account ;)
The statistical methods that we have discussed so far are known as frequentist (or classical) methods. The frequentist point of view is based on the following postulates:
F1 […]
F2 Parameters are fixed, unknown constants. Because they are not fluctuating, no useful probability statements can be made about parameters.
F3 […]
In a Bayesian analysis, the result of an inference, e.g. about the fairness of a coin as in Lindley's paradox, depends completely on the distribution of the alternative specified in the analysis. The frequentist analysis, for better and worse, doesn't need to specify a distribution for the alternative.
The classic Lindley's paradox uses a uniform alternative, but there is no justification for this at all. It's not as though a coin is either perfectly fair or has a totally random heads probability. A realistic bias will be subtle and the prior should reflect that. Something like this is often true of real-world applicaitons too.