Sorry, I meant the key. As all the linux distros using PGP signing demonstrate, people don't bother to verify the key, they just accept it blindly and assume everything is cool. Since only 1 out of a million people ask for this, and of those only 1 out of a million would actually go through the correct procedure rather than just grabbing the key from the same place they are grabbing the binaries and not verifying it in any way, it isn't worth the effort. The 0.001% of the 0.001% already have the tools available to verify, it is just a bit of a pain to do. It isn't worth it for the openbsd devs to waste time making it easier for those people who wouldn't verify the key anyways to feel secure when they would be exactly as secure as they are now. That's what I mean by security theatre.
That is the same situation we currently have. If Theo's machines get owned, we're boned. If they don't, we can easily verify that the sha-256 hash of the files on my hard drive, post download from wherever, match those that Theo built.
At the end of the day, you are drawing a line about where to stop verifying and start trusting. The fact that you are download binaries as opposed to source means you are trusting the openbsd developers, not just personally, but in that they have secured access to the code and build process to prevent tampering. So then the only part you aren't trusting is the distribution mechanism, which ssh keys and sha-256 hashes allow you to verify, rather than needing to rely on trust.
No doubt you can concoct a scenario involving malicious robotic brain worms coercing Matthew Dempsky into committing a malicious system call. "PGP doesn't address that!", you'll say, "so it's all just theater".
At the end of the day, you're simply wrong about the utility of release signing. You were mistaken about whether their security was compromised because signatures are fetched from the same location as the binaries (you were tripped up by the concept of "public key cryptography" there). And you were mistaken about the different threat models handled by SSH vs. PGP keys.
So you are saying the openbsd devs should waste time with PGP to solve an issue that is already solved (distribution security). The machine that would be signing the releases is already generating sha256 hashes of them. So as long as you can verify you are getting those hashes from that machine, you are as secure as you can get, PGP or not. And since you can get them over ssh, with a well known public key, you already have everything you need to deal with tampering during distribution. If the machine was compromised and those hashes altered, then it would have been just as much an issue if PGP were in use, since they could alter the binaries before they were signed. You already know all of this, I know you know this, you know you know this, so what are you trying to accomplish by pretending you caught a sudden case of mental retardation?
[0] There is an attack where the adversary distributes malicious binaries signed with a key that appears to belong to the OpenBSD project, but which in reality would belong to the adversary. This could work if the adversary manages to mislead the user, but if the OpenBSD project team uploaded their public key all over the Internet (and preferably announce it on the mailing lists and home page), then this attack is ineffective. During signature verification, the key ID that created the signature is displayed and the user would know that something is wrong if the signature has not created by the usual OpenBSD signing key.