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webber89

Re:CrackStation's Password Cracking Dictionary on Monday February 18, 2013 @05:36PM (#5241228)
Magnet link for the censored people:

magnet:?xt=urn:btih:fd62cc1d79f595cbe1de6356fb13c2165994e469&dn=crackstation.txt.gz&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.openbittorrent.com%3A80&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.publicbt.com%3A80&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.istole.it%3A6969&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.ccc.de%3A80

BTW, the guy's website is being HN'ed at the moment, so I'd come back in a couple hours or so.

Re:OpenBSD 5.2 released on Thursday November 01, 2012 @06:05PM (#4729978)
I know you can do that, but that's not the best solution. A signature of the install set made with a key known to belong to the OpenBSD project is probably a much better assurance of integrity and authenticity of the files.

Besides, how do you know the files and their hashes are not modified en route to you? One rogue node on the way to you (think AT&T Room 641A, but with data modification abilities) is all it takes, unless the transfer is SSL encrypted. And I don't mean just between you and the mirror, possibly also between the developers and the mirror (I bet some people would be very interested in backdooring one of the most secure systems on the planet by compromising their install images). Modification wouldn't matter as much with a signature-based system, since anyone doing the verification correctly would notice the signature verification failing or the signature coming from the wrong key (see my other comment for more information).

Re:OpenBSD 5.2 released on Thursday November 01, 2012 @05:52PM (#4729928)
If the binaries get tampered with on the server, then the file will fail the verification. If the signature gets tampered with on the server, the file will also fail the verification. I don't see how any tampering can cause problems, provided the OpenBSD project team publishes their public key widely [0].

[0] There is an attack where the adversary distributes malicious binaries signed with a key that appears to belong to the OpenBSD project, but which in reality would belong to the adversary. This could work if the adversary manages to mislead the user, but if the OpenBSD project team uploaded their public key all over the Internet (and preferably announce it on the mailing lists and home page), then this attack is ineffective. During signature verification, the key ID that created the signature is displayed and the user would know that something is wrong if the signature has not created by the usual OpenBSD signing key.

Re:OpenBSD 5.2 released on Thursday November 01, 2012 @05:10PM (#4729723)
I'm confused about something.

OpenBSD is supposedly one of the most secure OSs in existence. So how is it possible that I cannot find any digital signatures for the downloadable ISOs? I've been searching all over Google and the mirrors, but nothing has come up.

One person has suggested to just order a CD set from them, but I don't think that's a good solution. Having a secure verified copy of an OS should not require ordering a physical "gold master" set of discs to compare against.

I mean, we have all the necessary crypto, and anyone can use it. Generate a GPG/PGP signature of the install ISO and that's it, you're done. A lot of people do it - Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, all the big names... I mean seriously, even Arch Linux people do it, and until recently they didn't have package signing (now they do).

I'm not complaining or criticising OpenBSD, I'm just wondering about their attitude to this aspect of security. I would be very happy if anyone could elaborate on the topic.