True, but there aren't very many interface administrators. It looks like there are only 137 right now [0], which I agree is probably more than there should be, but that's still a relatively small number compared to the total number of active users. But there are lots of bots/duplicates in that list too, so the real number is likely quite a bit smaller. Plus, most of the users in that list are employed by Wikimedia, which presumably means that they're fairly well vetted.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/api.php?action=query&format=json&...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Interface_administra...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:ListUsers/interface-ad...
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:GlobalGroupPermissions
I'm sure there are Google engineers who can push changes to prod and bypass CI but that isn't a normal way to handle infra.
Unfortunately, Wikipedia is run on insecure user scripts created by volunteers that tend to be under the age of 18.
There might be more editors trying to resume boost if editing Wikipedia under your real name didn't invite endless harassment.
> Based on the fact user scripts are globally disabled now I'm guessing this was a vector.
Browsers still allow for user scripts via tools like TamperMonkey and GreaseMonkey, and that's not enforceable (and arguably, not even trivially visible) to sites, including Wikipedia.
As I say that out loud, I figure there's a separate ecosystem of Wikipedia-specific user scripts, but arguably the same problem exists.
You can also upload scripts to be shared and executed by other users.
As in, user can upload whatever they wish and it will be shown to them and ran, as JS, fully privileged and all.
A certain number of "community" admins maintain that right to this day after it was realized this was a massive security hole.
>There are currently 15 interface administrators (including two bots).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Interface_administra...
You're mixing up events. Superprotect is unrelated to the IAdmin separation from normal admin. The two are separated by many years and basically totally unrelated.
I agree with the rest of your post.
The Wikipedia community takes a cavalier attitude towards security. Any user with "interface administrator" status can change global JavaScript or CSS for all users on a given Wiki with no review. They added mandatory 2FA only a few years ago...
Prior to this, any admin had that ability until it was taken away due to English Wikipedia admins reverting Wikimedia changes to site presentation (Mediaviewer).
But that's not all. Most "power users" and admins install "user scripts", which are unsandboxed JavaScript/CSS gadgets that can completely change the operation of the site. Those user scripts are often maintained by long abandoned user accounts with no 2 factor authentication.
Based on the fact user scripts are globally disabled now I'm guessing this was a vector.
The Wikimedia foundation knows this is a security nightmare. I've certainly complained about this when I was an editor.
But most editors that use the website are not professional developers and view attempts to lock down scripting as a power grab by the Wikimedia Foundation.