These attestation methods would probably work well enough if you pin a specific key like for a hardened anti-evil-maid setup in a colo, but I doubt it'd work if it trusts a large number of vendor keys by default.
It also means that if you do get banned for any reason (obvious cheating) they then ban the EK and you need to go source more hardware.
It's not perfect but it raises the bar significantly for cheaters to the point that they don't bother.
The idea is you implement a fake driver to sign whatever message you want and totally faking your hardware list too. As long as they are relatively similar models I doubt there's a good way to tell.
Yeah, I think there are much easier ways to cheat at this point, like robotics/special hardware, so it probably does raise the bar.
Basically TPM includes key that's also signed with manufacturer key. You can't just extract it and signature ensures that this key is "trusted". When asked, TPM will return boot chain (including bootloader or UKI hash), signed by its own key which you can present to remote party. The whole protocol is more complicated and includes challenge.
I'm not aware that a TPM is capable of hiding a key without the OS being able to access/unseal it at some point. It can display a signed boot chain but what would it be signed with?
If it's not signed with a key out of the reach of the system, you can always implement a fake driver pretty easily to spoof it.