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Re:Linux is good now; to feel like you actually own your PC,... by digiown on Thursday January 01, 2026 @11:24PM (#46461396)
Ah, got it. With enough motivation this is still pretty easily defeated though. The key is in some kind of NVRAM, which can be read with specialized equipment, and once it's out, you can use it to spoof signatures on a different machine and cheat as usual. The TPM implementations of a lot of consumer hardware is also rather questionable.

These attestation methods would probably work well enough if you pin a specific key like for a hardened anti-evil-maid setup in a colo, but I doubt it'd work if it trusts a large number of vendor keys by default.

Re:Linux is good now; to feel like you actually own your PC,... by tapoxi on Friday January 02, 2026 @12:04AM (#46461594)
Once it's out you could but EKs are unique and tied to hardware. Using an EK to sign a boot state on hardware that doesn't match is a flag to an anti-cheat tool, and would only ever work for one person.

It also means that if you do get banned for any reason (obvious cheating) they then ban the EK and you need to go source more hardware.

It's not perfect but it raises the bar significantly for cheaters to the point that they don't bother.

Re:Linux is good now; to feel like you actually own your PC,... by digiown on Friday January 02, 2026 @12:09AM (#46461622)
> Using an EK to sign a boot state on hardware that doesn't match is a flag to an anti-cheat tool

The idea is you implement a fake driver to sign whatever message you want and totally faking your hardware list too. As long as they are relatively similar models I doubt there's a good way to tell.

Yeah, I think there are much easier ways to cheat at this point, like robotics/special hardware, so it probably does raise the bar.

Re:Linux is good now; to feel like you actually own your PC,... by fc417fc802 on Friday January 02, 2026 @05:42AM (#46463502)
Any sane scheme would whitelist TPM implementations. Anyway fTPMs are a thing now which would ultimately tie the underlying security of the anticheat to the CPU manufacturer.