It's a race condition resulting in memory corruption.[1][2] That corruption is shown to result in a crash. I don't think the implication is that it can result only in crashes, but this is not mentioned in the CVE.
Whether it is a vulnerability that an attacker can crash a system depends on your security model, I guess. In general it is not expected to happen and it stops other software from running, and can be controlled by entities or software who should not have that level of control, so it's considered a vulnerability.
[1] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2025-68260 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2025121614-CVE-20...
Of course, this bug was in an `unsafe` block, which is exactly what you would expect given Rust's promises.
The promise of Rust was never that it is magical. The promise is that it is significantly easier to manage these types of problems.
The fix was outside of any Rust unsafe blocks. Which confused a lot of Rust developers on Reddit and elsewhere. Since fans of Rust have often repeated that only unsafe blocks have to be checked. Despite the Rustonomicon clearly spelling out that much more than the unsafe blocks might need to be checked in order to avoid UB.
Whether it is "significantly easier" to manage these types of problems and at what cost remains to be seen.
I do not understand you comment about "confirmation bias" as did not make a quantitative prediction that could have bias.
Safe Rust does do this. Dropping into unsafe Rust is the prerogative of the programmer who wants to take on the burden of preventing bugs themselves. Part of the technique of Rust programming is minimising the unsafe part so memory errors are eliminated as much as possible.
If the kernel could be written in 100% safe Rust, then any memory error would be a compiler bug.
Even if you somehow manage to ignore the very obvious theoretical argument why it works, the amount of quantitative evidence at this point is staggering: Rust, including unsafe warts and all, substantially improve the ability of any competent team to deliver working software. By a huge margin.
This is the programming equivalent of vaccine denialism.
It is intended that Safe Rust be the main competitor to C. You are not meant to write your whole program in unsafe Rust using raw pointers - that would indicate a significant failure of Rust’s expressive power.
Its true that many Rust programs involve some element of unsafe Rust, but that unsafety is meant to be contained and abstracted, not pervasive throughout the program. That’s a significant difference from how C’s unsafety works.
Does anyone involved in any of this work believe that a CVE in an unsafe block could not happen?
https://youtu.be/dgPI7NfKCiQ?si=BVBQ0MxuDpsbCvOk
The TLDR is that this race condition happened with unsafe code, which was needed to interact with existing C code. This was not a vulnerability with Rust's model.
That said, you can absolutely use bad coding practices in Rust that can cause issues, even for a regular programmer.
Using unwrap without dealing with all return cases is one example. Of course, there is a right way to dealing with return methods, but it's up to the programmer to follow it
I do not blame you, for you had the competence and honesty to ask instead of incompetently and dishonestly jumping to incorrect conclusions.
was it a security vulnerability? I'm pretty sure it was "just" a crash. Though maybe someone smarter than me could have turned that into something more.
I have no dog in this race, I really like the idea of Rust drivers but can very much understand retiscience at getting Rust to be handling more core parts of the kernel, just because Rust's value seems to pay off way more in higher level code where you have these invariants to maintain across large code paths (meanwhile writing a bunch of doubly-linked lists in unsafe Rust seems a bit like busy work, modulo the niceties Rust itself can give you)