Isn't this just the same value judgment mistake? You're just presupposing that things like "smaller code base" are better in virtue of themselves the same way that "rewritten in Rust" might be as well.

The parent poster's point is seemingly to reject "this is simply the better thing" (ie: "small code is better") and instead to focus on "for what we are doing it is the better thing". Why would "basic" profiler use be better than "niche" or "advanced" profiler use if for that context basic would actually have been inferior (for whatever value of basic we choose to go with)?

It seems to me that the reality we're often confronted with is that "better" is contextual, and I would say that "basic" or "smaller" are contextual too.

Is the trade off here having more secure code in exchange for added complexity/difficulty? This is a real question, has the Tor code itself been exploited by bad actors before? All the incedences I've seen in the news were some other software running over tor that would be exploited to phone home or give up user data.

It seems they worry about it, which I can understand. But now with Rust I worry about about new logic bugs, supply chain issues, and lack of proper security updates.

Well, given that this has been going on for years, you can already start to empirically evaluate that question.

> (So far, it's a not-very-complete client. But watch this space!)

Yes, it's a beginning not the end.

Or, you could look at other projects who have been using Rust for many years, and consider these factors there too. The folks who have have generally concluded the opposite.

Do you think the sibling comment was flagged to "protect me" whatever that means, or is it because "Are you high on Prozac?" is not really a productive comment?

EDIT: And now that I've scrolled down, I see you've left this comment many times as random replies. I'm sure those will get flagged, but for spam reasons, not due to some grand conspiracy.

The distribution I use already has limited security updates for Rust: https://www.debian.org/releases/trixie/release-notes/issues.... which reduces my security. The cargo supply chain issues are also very obvious, I am far more worried about this than I ever will be about memory safety, but hopefully tor reduces its reliance on random dependencies.

I find that surprising given that Debian breaks Rust programs up into individual apt packages, but ultimately, other distros do not have this issue. It’s also about userspace programs and not the kernel, which does not use external packages and so sidesteps this completely.

Debian forky has Rust in the kernel on by default.

I guess the want to be able to update individual libraries to provide security updates.

Right, from my understanding, Debian was packaging Rust programs in the same way as C ones. So they’d update the individual library and it should be all good. They deduplicated all of the dependencies in their trees.

This seems reasonable to me. If you have a tarmaggeedon, you update one library instead of thousand of packages. Although I am not sure how well this can work in Rust with monomorphization.

I think the chance that your Rust application is going to be more performant or efficient than C, is whether you are focused on writing performant and efficient code. Out-of-the-box, I’m guessing people will use too many cargo packages, each that are over-engineered or written by less-experienced developers, so it will be less efficient and less performant.

In addition, you could more easily inadvertently introduce security problems.

Is Rust the right choice for Tor? Sure. Is Tor the right choice for security? If they moved to Rust, they increased security risks to make it easier to manage and find help from younger less-experienced developers, so no.

Given how heavily most C programs lean on type erasure vs. monomorphization and how often they reimplement basic data structures, it's kind of a miracle they hold up against Rust/C++.

Why? Monomorphization often leads to great results in microbenchmarks due to super-specialized code but also to bloat.

> I think the chance that your Rust application is going to be more performant or efficient than C, is whether you are focused on writing performant and efficient code.

I believe that depends on the sophistication of algorithms. High-level algorithms (especially if they involve concurrency or parallelism) are much easier to write in Rust (or in C++) than in C, which gives them a pretty good chance to be at least as fast as any reasonably safe C implementation.

For low-level algorithms, of course, it's really hard to beat polished C code.

> Out-of-the-box, I’m guessing people will use too many cargo packages, each that are over-engineered or written by less-experienced developers, so it will be less efficient and less performant.

I don't think that this is going to be a problem. The Tor Project developers I've interacted with sounded quite serious about security. Forbidding non-blessed cargo packages is pretty trivial.

> In addition, you could more easily inadvertently introduce security problems.

What do you mean?

Sometimes language is a limiting factor and so you need to change languages before getting better. However this is rare.