Zig as a language is not worth, but as a build system it's amazing. I wouldn't be surprised if Zig gets in just because of the much better build system than C ever had (you can cross compile not only across OS, but also across architecture and C stlib versions, including musl). And with that comes the testing system and seamless interop with C, which make it really easy to start writing some auxiliary code in Zig... and eventually it may just be accepted for any development.

I agree with you that it's much more interesting than the language, but I don't think it matters for a project like the Kernel that already had its build system sorted out. (Especially since no matter how nice and convenient Zig makes cross-compilation if you start a project from scratch, even in Rust thanks to cargo-zigbuild, it would require a lot of efforts to migrate the Linux build system to Zig, only to realize it doesn't support all the needs of the kernel at the start).

Pardon my ignorance but I find the claim "removing the nastiest cla ss of security vulnerabilities" to be a bold claim. Is there ZERO use of "unsafe" rust in kernel code??

Aside from the minimal use of unsafe being heavily audited and the only entry point for those vulnerabilities, it allows for expressing kernel rules explicitly and structurally whereas at best there was a code comment somewhere on how to use the API correctly. This was true because there was discussion precisely about how to implement Rust wrappers for certain APIs because it was ambiguous how those APIs were intended to work.

So aside from being like 1-5% unsafe code vs 100% unsafe for C, it’s also more difficult to misuse existing abstractions than it was in the kernel (not to mention that in addition to memory safety you also get all sorts of thread safety protections).

In essence it’s about an order of magnitude fewer defects of the kind that are particularly exploitable (based on research in other projects like Android)

You can absolutely write drivers with zero unsafe Rust. The bridge from Rust to C is where unsafe code lies.

And hardware access. You absolutely can't write a hardware driver without unsafe.

There are devices that do not have access to memory, and you can write a safe description of such a device's registers. The only thing that is inherently unsafe is building DMA descriptors.

Not zero, but Rust-based kernels (see redox, hubris, asterinas, or blog_os) have demonstrated that you only need a small fraction of unsafe code to make a kernel (3-10%) and it's also the least likely places to make a memory-related error in a C-based kernel in the first place (you're more likely to make a memory-related error when working on the implementation of an otherwise challenging algorithm that has nothing to do with memory management itself, than you are when you are explicitly focused on the memory-management part).

So while there could definitely be an exploitable memory bug in the unsafe part of the kernel, expect those to be at least two orders of magnitude less frequent than with C (as an anecdotal evidence, the Android team found memory defects to be between 3 and 4 orders of magnitude less in practice over the past few years).

"Unsafe" rust still upholds more guarantees than C code. The rust compiler still enforces the borrow checker (including aliasing rules) and type system.

It removes a class of security vulnerabilities, modulo any unsound unsafe (in compiler, std/core and added dependency).

In practice you see several orders of magnitude fewer segfaults (like in Google Android CVE). You can compare Deno and Bun issue trackers for segfaults to see it in action.

As mentioned a billion times, seatbelts don't prevent death, but they do reduce the likelihood of dying in a traffic accident. Unsafe isn't a magic bullet, but it's a decent caliber round.

“by removing the nastiest class of security vulnerabilities” and “reduce the likelihood” don’t seem to be in the same neighborhood.

In theory they are the same statement; in practice there is 0.01% chance someone wrote unsound code.

Dividing their number by 1000[1] is technically the later but in practice it's pretty much the former.

[1]: this the order of magnitude presented in the recent Android blog post: https://security.googleblog.com/2025/11/rust-in-android-move...

> Our historical data for C and C++ shows a density of closer to 1,000 memory safety vulnerabilities per MLOC. Our Rust code is currently tracking at a density orders of magnitude lower: a more than 1000x reduction.

If you are reducing the likelihood of something by 99%, you are basically eliminating it. Not fully, but it’s still a huge improvement.

It reminds me of this fun question:

What’s the difference between a million dollars and a billion dollars? A billion dollars.

A million dollars is a lot of money to most people, but it’s effectively nothing compared to a billion dollars.