News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by tptacek on Monday November 24, 2025 @07:35PM (#46041069)
See, this gets you into trouble, because Bernstein has actually a pretty batshit take on nothing-up-my-sleeve constructions (see the B4D455 paper) --- and that argument also hurts his position on Kyber, which does NUMS stuff!
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by cryptonector on Monday November 24, 2025 @10:16PM (#46041994)
Link?
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by tptacek on Monday November 24, 2025 @10:26PM (#46042040)
I tried a couple searches and I forget which calculator-speak version of "BADASS" Bernstein actually used, but the concept of the paper† is that all the NUMS-style curves are suspect because you can make combinations of mathematical constants say whatever you want them to say (in combination), and so instead you should pick curve constants based purely on engineering excellence, which nobody could ever disagree about or (looks around the room) start huge conspiracy theories over.

† as I remember it

Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by philodeon on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @05:38AM (#46044527)
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by philodeon on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @07:00AM (#46044997)
There’s also a more approachable set of slides on the topic at https://cr.yp.to/talks/2025.11.14/slides-djb-20251114-safecu...
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by tptacek on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @12:39PM (#46048318)
What do you think of those slides?
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by philodeon on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @01:06PM (#46048689)
I didn’t see anything “batshit” in either the paper or the slides.
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by tptacek on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @01:07PM (#46048701)
Say more. What do you think of his argument? I paraphrased it downthread. Do you think I did so accurately? If not: what did I get wrong?
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by philodeon on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @01:19PM (#46048851)
At least in terms of the Bada55 paper, I think he writes in a fairly jocular style that sounds unprofessional unless you read his citations as well. You seem to object to his occasional jocularity and take it as prima facie evidence of him being “batshit”. Given that you are well known for a jocular writing style, perhaps you should extend some grace.

The slides seem like a pretty nice summary of the 2015-era SafeCurves work, which you acknowledge elsewhere on this site (this thread? They all blend together) was based on good engineering.

Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by tptacek on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @02:03PM (#46049399)
No, what I'm saying has only to do with the substance of his claims, which I now think you don't understand, because I laid them out straightforwardly (I might have been wrong, but I definitely wasn't making a tone argument) and you came back with this. People actually do work in this field. You can't just bluster your way through it.

This is a "challenge" with discussing Bernstein claims on Hacker News and places like it --- the threads are full of people who know two cryptographers in the whole world (Bernstein and Schneier) and axiomatically derive their claims from "whatever those two said is probably true". It's the same way you get these inane claims that Kyber was backdoored by the NSA --- by looking at the list of authors on Kyber and not recognizing a single one of them.

What do you think about Bernstein's arguments for SNTRUP being safe while Kyber isn't? Super curious. I barely follow. Maybe you've got a better grip on the controversy.

Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by philodeon on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @03:25PM (#46050317)
I’m not sure why you’re hung up on SNTRUP, since DJB didn’t submit it past round 2 of NISTPQC. In round 3, DJB put his full weight behind Classic McEliece.

You’ve previously argued that “cryptosystems based on ring-LWE hardness have been worked on by giants in the field since the mid-1990s” and suggested this is a point in Kyber’s favor. Well, news flash, McEliece has been worked on by giants in the field for 45 years. It shows up in NSA’s declassified internal history book, though their insights into the crypto system are still classified to this day.

Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by tptacek on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @03:26PM (#46050335)
How long do you think people have been working on lattice cryptography?
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by philodeon on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @03:44PM (#46050533)
Lattices themselves have been analyzed since the days of Gauss. Lattice cryptography is only a couple decades old (in the unclassified literature).

The first proposed lattice-based cryptosystem was completely broken within 2 years of its announcement, which is an lovely harbinger of Kyber’s fate.

Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by tptacek on Tuesday November 25, 2025 @03:45PM (#46050553)
That's a funny claim given NTRU goes back to 1996 and was a PQC finalist. I barely know what I'm talking about here and even I think you're bluffing your way through this. At this point you're making arguments Bernstein would presumably himself reject!
Re:NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand by tptacek on Wednesday November 26, 2025 @12:44PM (#46060168)
Since you've been very strident throughout this thread I'm wondering if you're going to have a response to this. Similarly, I'm curious, as a scholar of Bernstein's cryptography writing --- did the MOV attack (prominently featured on Safecurves) serve as a lovely harbinger of the failure of elliptic curve cryptography?