Absolutely do what you can, but understand that it's futile to defend against your own cloud provider.
The only issue left would be managed services though, which then I wouldn’t use, but I’d be able to run my own postgre safely on infra I’m renting.
Intel's SGX has been broken a number of times and that should be harder to break than TDX. Like I said in my original comment though, do all the things. But if you find yourself relying on TDX to protect live(s), please pay a computer security professional to audit your security and do a threat assessment.
I’ll do all the things if ever needed, but I get that if a cloud act request happens , your cloud provider will be able to get your stuff.
I’m specialized enough in another field to know that I’m not a security person in spite of my interest in it ( I used to enjoy reverse engineering back in the days ) - I wouldn’t make that kind of decision without consulting a professional first.
I get that FHE is not realistic today, but can’t I use ( if it’s really critical) a combination of confidential vms and an external hsm ? I understand I’ll be limited to traditional workloads , and not managed services though.
I asked the wrong question, what I really meant was ‘if I run in a less trusted environment, am I not supposed to use all possible crypto mechanisms available to make that environment more trustworthy , so that I can’t be deceived by my cloud operator sending my data to the us government’