Also, it's much easier for an intelligence service to get the hand on a 1kB encryption key than on a PB of data: the former is much easier to exfiltrate without being noticed.
And then I don't know why you bring encryption here: pretty much none of the use-case for using a cloud allow for fully encrypted data. (The only one that does is storing encrypted backups on the cloud, but the issue here is that the operator didn't do backups in the first place…)
2. The operative assumption in my statement is that the government does not possess the key. If they do possess it, all bets are off.
3. This thread is about a hypothetical situation in which the Korean government did store backups with a U.S.-based cloud provider, and whether encryption of such backups would provide adequate protection against unwanted intrusion into the data held within.
All bets are off from the start. At some point the CIA managed to get their hands on the French nuclear keys…
> 3. This thread is about a hypothetical situation in which the Korean government did store backups with a U.S.-based cloud provider
This thread is about using US cloud providers, that's it, you are just moving the goalpost.
They were still right though: it's absolutely clear without an ounce of doubt that whatever you put on an US cloud is being accessible by the US government, who can also decide to sanction you and deprive you from your ability to access the data yourself.
Not having backups is entirely retarded, but also completely orthogonal.