By contrast, OV certs, which were originally supposed a very similar level of assurance, were did away with by CAs themselves, by cost-optimizing the verification requirements into virtual nonexistence.
That said, it remains a perpetual struggle to get people to understand the difference between being connected to the legitimate operator of satan.example (something an Internet-wide system mostly can guarantee) and it being wise to transact there (something extensive experience shows it can’t and shouldn’t try to). And if you’re a domain owner, your domain is your identity; pick one and stick to it. Stackoverflow.blog is stupid, don’t be like stackoverflow.blog.
[1] https://www.troyhunt.com/extended-validation-certificates-ar...
[2] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/12/nope-...
That's because the browser implementers gave up on trying to solve the identity problem. It's too difficult they said, we'd rather push other things.
Google implemented certificate pinning in Chrome for themselves and a few friends, said fuck everyone else, and declared the problem solved. Who cares about everyone else when your own properties are protected and you control the browser?
Meanwhile the average user has no idea what a certificate does, whether it does or doesn't prove identity.
No wonder they removed the lock icon from the browser.
It's a good thing the WebPKI cartel mostly did away with EV certs.... these days any old cert where only the SAN matches the domain and your browser gives a warm fuzzy "you're secure!"