Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr...
by roywiggins on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @03:32PM
(#44955382)
In this specific case running linters doesn't even need that much I think, it's never going to need to reach out to GitHub on its own, let alone Anthropic etc. The linter process likely doesn't even need network access, just stdout so you can gather the result and fire that back to GitHub or whenever it needs to go. Just executing it with an empty environment would have helped things (though obviously an RCE would still be bad)
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr...
by wahnfrieden on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @03:27PM
(#44955333)
It is a national security concern more than a business ownership & market concern
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr...
by Nextgrid on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @03:32PM
(#44955386)
Unless "national security" is going to either pay people proactively to pass gov-mandated pentests, or enforce actual, business-threatening penalties for breaches, it doesn't really matter from a company owner perspective. They're not secure, but neither are their competitors, so it's all good.
This would make it so that even a compromised downstream service wouldn't actually be able to exfiltrate the authentication token, and all its misdeeds would be logged by the proxy service, making post-incident remediation easier (and being able to definitely prove whether anything bad has actually happened).