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Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by curuinor on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @01:49PM (#44954242)
hey, this is Howon from CodeRabbit here. we wish to note that this RCE was reported and fixed in January. it was entirely prospective and no customer data was affected. we have extensive sandboxing for basically any execution of anything now, including any and every tool and all generated code of any kind under the CodeRabbit umbrella.

if you want to learn how CodeRabbit does the isolation, here's a blog post about how: https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/ai-machine-learning/h...

Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by mpeg on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @02:18PM (#44954560)
Where can we find the blog post you made back in January about the RCE fix explaining what measures you took to check if any customer data had been affected?
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by frankfrank13 on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @02:27PM (#44954660)
Reading this, its not clear how your blog posts relates:

1. You run git clone inside the GCR function, so, you have at the very least a user token for the git provider

2. RCE exploit basically used the external tools, like a static analysis checker, which again, is inside your GCR function

3. As a contrived example, if I could RCE `console.log(process.env)` then seemingly I could do `fetch(mywebsite....`

I get it, you can hand wave some amount of "VPC" and "sandbox" here. But, you're still executing code, explicitly labeling it "untrusted" and "sandboxed" doesn't excuse it.

Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by cleverwebb on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @02:03PM (#44954399)
how do you know that no customer data was affected? did you work with github and scan all uses of your keys? how do you know if a use of your github key was authentic or not? did you check with anthroipic/openai/etc to scan logs usage?

It's really hard to trust a "hey we got this guys" statement after a fuckup this big

Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by Xunjin on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @02:54PM (#44954937)
That's why countries should start to legislate on these matters, there are no incentives in focusing on security and properly report to the customers such vulnerability.
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by xign on Tuesday August 26, 2025 @03:53PM (#45031506)
Notice how replies like this never get a response?
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by thyrfa on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @01:52PM (#44954279)
How can you guarantee that nobody ripped the private key before the researcher told you about the issue though?
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by KingOfCoders on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @01:53PM (#44954292)
Or has a backdoor installed somewhere?
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by blibble on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @06:47PM (#44956956)
if they can't guarantee this then every single repo that had coderabbit is potentially compromised
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by KingOfCoders on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @01:52PM (#44954284)
The chuzpe to use this as PR.
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by Xunjin on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @02:50PM (#44954889)
Silicon Valley sitcom comedy moment right here.
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by woodruffw on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @04:34PM (#44956001)
Off topic, but: chutzpah is the conventional English spelling :-)

Edit: I'm this old when I learned that Germans spell it "chuzpe."

Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by KingOfCoders on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @11:51PM (#44958486)
I'm this old to learn that the Yiddish spelling is chutzpe with a `T` (thought it would be Chuzpe).
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by elpakal on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @02:26PM (#44954648)
> Sandboxing: All Cloud Run instances are sandboxed with two layers of sandboxing and can be configured to have minimal IAM permissions via dedicated service identity. In addition, CodeRabbit is leveraging Cloud Run's second generation execution environment, a microVM providing full Linux cgroup functionality. Within each Cloud Run instance, CodeRabbit uses Jailkit to create isolated processes and cgroups to further restrict the privileges of the jailed process.

In case you don't want to read through the PR

Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by 0x457 on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @04:07PM (#44955735)
I don't get it, if you're running on linux then just use Landlock LSM inside a VM.
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by tadfisher on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @01:55PM (#44954318)
But do you still store your GH API private key in environment variables?
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by curuinor on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @02:26PM (#44954651)
hey, this is Howon from CodeRabbit. We use a cloud-provider-provided key vault for application secrets, including GH private key.
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by musicnarcoman on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @03:28PM (#44955337)
So the CodeRabbit application with access to application secrets still runs in the same virtual machine as untrusted code from the outside?
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by megamorf on Wednesday August 20, 2025 @04:29AM (#44959906)
Howon, you can stop posting that canned response. It's not helping the discussion in any way and matches the lack of detail the other commenters have pointed out.
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by yunohn on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @02:15PM (#44954533)
While I fully understand that things sometimes get missed, it just seems really bizarre to me that somehow “sandboxing/isolation” was never considered prior to this incident. To me, it feels like the first thing to implement in a system that is explicitly built to run third party untrusted code?
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by wging on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @02:26PM (#44954652)
The article seems to imply that something of the sort had actually been attempted prior to the incident, but was either incomplete or buggy. I'm not sure the details would be entirely exculpatory, but unless you want to flatly disbelieve their statements, "not considered" isn't quite right.

> After responsibly disclosing this critical vulnerability to the CodeRabbit team, we learned from them that they had an isolation mechanism in place, but Rubocop somehow was not running inside it.

Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by roywiggins on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @03:39PM (#44955472)
It seems to me that they thought the linter would be safe to run as it wasn't meant to actually run untrusted code, just statically analyze it.
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by jsbg on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @03:45PM (#44955537)
wild to comment this
Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by progbits on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @04:22PM (#44955898)
> no customer data was affected

Someone could have taken the private github key and cloned your customers' private repos.

You would need to audit every single access to github made via your app since the beginning and link it somehow to your side. Did you do this?

Re:How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From Simple PR to RCE and Wr... by smsm42 on Tuesday August 19, 2025 @05:34PM (#44956471)
The word "now" here is kinda worrying tbh. How was it a good idea to release and sell this product before it has been the case?