(I call it neorationalism because it is philosophically unrelated to the more traditional rationalism of Spinoza and Descartes.)
That is the bullshit part.
There's a point where more passive thinking stops adding value and starts subtracting sanity. It's pretty easy to get to that point. We've all done it.
This is a common sentiment but is probably not entirely true. A great example is cosmology. Yes, more data would make some work easier, but astrophysicists and cosmologists have shown that you can gather and combine existing data and look at it in novel new ways to produce unexpected results, like place bounds that can include/exclude various theories.
I think a philosophy that encourages more analysis rather than sitting back on our laurels with an excuse that we need more data is good, as long as it's done transparently and honestly.
The qualifier "normally" already covers "not entirely true". Of course it's not entirely true. It's mostly true for us now. (In fact twenty years ago we used more numerical models than we do now, because we were facing more unsolved problems where the solution was pretty well knowable just by doing more complicated calculations, but without taking more data. Back then, when people started taking lots of data, it was often a total waste of time. But right now, most of those problems seem to be solved. We're facing different problems that seem much harder to model, so we rely more on data. This stage won't be permanent either.)
It's not a sentiment, it's a reality that we have to deal with.
And I think you missed the main point of my reply: that people often think we need more data, but cleverness and ingenuity can often find a way to make meaningful progress with existing data. Obviously I can't make any definitive judgment about your specific case, but I'm skeptical of any claim that it's out of the realm of possibility that some genius like Einstein analyzed your problem could get no further than you have.
I read your point and answered it twice. Your latest response seems to indicate that you're ignoring those responses. For example you seem to suggest that I'm "claim[ing] that it's out of the realm of possibility" for "Einstein" to make progress on our work without taking more data. But anyone can hit "parent" a few times and see what I actually claimed. I claimed "mostly" and "for us where I work". I took the time to repeat that for you. That time seems wasted now.
Perhaps you view "getting more data" as an extremely unpleasant activity, to be avoided at all costs? You may be an astronomer, for example. Or maybe you see taking more data before thinking as some kind of admission of defeat? We don't use that kind of metric. For us it's a question of the cheapest and fastest way to solve each problem.
if modeling is slower and more expensive than measuring, we measure. If not, we model. You do you.
If you are talking about cosmology? Yea, you can look at existing data in new ways, cause you probably have enough data to do that safely.
If you are looking at human psychology? Looking at existing data in new ways is essentially p-hacking. And you probably won’t ever have enough data to define a “universal theory of the human mind”.
I agree that the type of analysis is important, as is the type and quality of the data you're analyzing. You can p-hack in cosmology too, but it's not a quality argument there either.
> And you probably won’t ever have enough data to define a “universal theory of the human mind”.
I think you're underestimating human ability to generalize principles from even small amounts of data [1]. Regardless, my point was more specifically that we could use existing data to generate constraints to exclude certain theories of mind, which has definitely happened.
The first is diffusion of power. Social media is powered by charisma, and while it is certainly true that personality-based cults are nothing new, the internet makes it way easier to form one. Contrast that with academic philosophy. People can have their own little fiefdoms, and there is certainly abuse of power, but rarely concentrated in such a way that you see within rationalist communities.
The second (and more idealistic) is that the discipline of Philosophy is rooted in the Platonic/Socratic notion that "I know that I know nothing." People in academic philosophy are on the whole happy to provide a gloss on a gloss on some important thinker, or some kind of incremental improvement over somebody else's theory. This makes it extremely boring, and yet, not nearly as susceptible to delusions of grandeur. True skepticism has to start with questioning one's self, but everybody seems to skip that part and go right to questioning everybody else.
Rationalists have basically reinvented academic philosophy from the ground up with none of the rigor, self-discipline, or joy. They mostly seem to dedicate their time to providing post-hoc justifications for the most banal unquestioned assumptions of their subset of contemporary society.
Taking academic philosophy seriously, at least as an historical phenomenon, would require being educated in the humanities, which is unpopular and low-status among Rationalists.
Nuh-uh! Eliezer Yudkowsky wrote that his mother made this mistake, so he's made sure to say things in the right order for the reader not to make this mistake. Therefore, true Rationalists™ are immune to this mistake. https://www.readthesequences.com/Knowing-About-Biases-Can-Hu...
I can see how that applies to Socrates, but I wouldn't guess it also applies to e.g. Hegel.
I guess I'm a radical skeptic, secular humanist, utilitarianish sort of guy, but I'm not dumb enough to think throwing around the words "bayesian prior" and "posterior distribution" makes actually figuring out how something works or predicting the outcome of an intervention easy or certain. I've had a lot of life at this point and gotten to some level of mastery at a few things and my main conclusion is that most of the time its just hard to know stuff and that the single most common cognitive mistake people make is too much certainty.