Zero knowledge proofs are not vulnerable to traffic analysis the same way VPNs are.
For instance: The relying party server needs to call the auth server on novel users. Thats a new, unavoidable indicator!
How large are token batches and how long do they last? Will the implementation force them to wait a time period between redemption and use?
A bad implementation means the user IP will talk to the A server, then it will contact the RP server, who will contact the A server. Because this happens once per connection (or 60 minutes in this bill) and takes maybe a few hundred milliseconds. there's not going to be a huge number of candidates to have to sort through. And that's just the handshake.
Not really. There is no requirement here for an auth server to neccesarily even exist.
That said, your broader point is correct, that the details matter a tremendous amount.
Very cool! Always happy to be proven wrong with cool tech!
All comms are subject to traffic analysis except surreptitious, covert channels (which can't be covert if the implementations are widely available).
Mullvad is the only VPN I know of that has a mode that normalizes all packets to the same size (going into the VPN) and sends fake packets that don't get sent as real traffic. But that's only obfuscation and, at low traffic or high bandwidth (videos) or with sufficient heuristics, it can be beaten.
The US has basically zero regulation on selling this data. I can imagine a world where within a couple decades the US has one of the largest blackmail crisis ever seen, as foreign governments target civil workers. Or, I guess, at this point, the US government against the "undesirable" party within this administration.