I think that if the operating system (and the computer design too) were designed better, then I think that it might be possible to do that, and other things (e.g. all outbound network requests must go through a specified proxy without the program knowing of the proxy, or must use a specific network interface, etc).
It is not. The Containerization framework [1] is, in its own words, "a Swift package for running Linux containers on macOS" - it's more or less an Apple-branded Docker runtime. It's not applicable to macOS software.
The underlying sandbox subsystem is what App Sandbox uses. Apple can happily rely on implementation details of system frameworks in their policies because they can update them as the system frameworks change.
The sandbox subsystem is what all of Apple's system software uses for sandboxing, as well as many security-conscious third-party programs such as web browsers. It's not going anywhere anytime soon, despite being marked as deprecated.
The easiest solution is to give up and use Linux (Docker).
shell my:sandbox
I also use sandbox-exec with limitations to the pwd, depending on what I want to exec.https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/accessing...
Now you're wondering why this isn't built in to the OS. But it is! Apps from the Mac App Store are always sandboxed. Just get your apps from there, and now you know what permissions they need because the store can tell you, as can the Settings app. You can even toggle permissions on and off via Settings.
macOS has the best sandbox of any desktop OS by far. Seatbelt isn't actually deprecated and never has been. Marking it as such seems to be just a way to warn developers off trying to use it directly. Nonetheless, it's not going anywhere: Chrome's sandbox relies on it heavily and if Apple tried to remove it or even just break backwards compatibility with it they'd break Chrome, and if not done in a coordinated manner that'd open up a lot of nasty lawsuit potential and corporate relationship problems.
The reason Apple don't want you using Seatbelt directly is that you have to be an expert in macOS internals to use it correctly ... and those internals change with every release. I reported a vulnerability to a well known company just a couple of weeks ago that involved them using Seatbelt wrong! Apple's entitlements wrap up a common set of use cases under a stable API and it's then on Apple to keep them working correctly as the internals move around.
They will even list all the capabilities before installing, and I believe it can handle auto updates outside the MS Store as well.
But I think the main issue is that you can't give granular permissions. I would like to make my own sandbox rules, like only enable a single domain for networking for the app, only allow specific folders, etc.
I don't think you can get this granularity on macOS/Windows right now.
This stuff is so frustrating though! If your sandboxing mechanism requires you to be "an expert in macOS internals" it's not going to get used often, and the people who DO use it are liable to make mistakes.
Clear documentation and a great developer experience are, in my opinion, essential for sandboxing mechanisms - and most of them don't have that.
I want a solution I can distribute to other people where the first step isn't "install Docker".
The main reasons to prefer a Linux container are:
• The agent can install new software packages if it needs them. If you use a native Mac sandbox then it'd need to ask permission to use homebrew. Maybe you can find a way to run homebrew inside a Mac sandbox but it won't be straightforward.
• Simpler boundary. The bug I reported (in an AI agent sandbox using Seatbelt) was that it failed to properly block off access to the user's home directory dotfiles and ~/Library. This sort of mistake is easy to make with Seatbelt but harder to make with containers. There are many other sandbox escapes in the policy I saw. Note that using Apple's standard sandbox APIs would avoid this type of error.
• You can edit the SSL root store for just the agent, meaning you can MITM traffic from the agent to the internet. Doing that with native Mac apps isn't possible unless the user actually modifies the root store, which they may not want to do.
Maybe the new "containers" stuff in macOS 26 is going to be a good replacement for that? It seems like that's a different solution though.
All I want is an easy, documented, supported way to run a binary on my computer and say "it can only access these files, use this much RAM and it's not allowed to make any outbound network requests". It always surprises me how hard this is!