> the protections mooted to keep "users" away from "wheel" are basically pointless and counterproductive in a world where attacks come from outside.
Attacks may come from the outside, but they usually exploit code running on the target. IIRC, Apparmor is an implementation of what you seek - an easy way to limit what any given executable can do, in addition to what its process credentials can do.
You can do quite a bit in Linux with CGroups and SELinux. Projects making good use of those are Fedora, Systemd and Chromium browser.
I'll check it out. Next up, doing away with POSIX.
POSIX defines a pretty good framework, which is why Plan 9 is POSIX-ish. They changed things that they thought needed improvement. I just wanted to point out that doing away with POSIX merely to do away with POSIX isn't necessarily wise; if you don't have a better idea to use instead, you'll just end up reimplementing much of POSIX under another name.
In a related vein, I idly wonder if there's a project around intended to bring useful security to a practical Unix derivative. Nobody uses a big timesharing box any longer (for all reasonable definitions of nobody); and the protections mooted to keep "users" away from "wheel" are basically pointless and counterproductive in a world where attacks come from outside. Apple's code-signing is one reaction to this new reality; what's the current status of capability based systems?