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Re:US defense secretary circumvents the official communicati... by fidotron on Thursday May 01, 2025 @07:58AM (#43856523)
> Anything sent with Signal needs to be treated as published with an unknown delay.

Oddly they have thought of that already, to the point all encryption systems in use in the gov are thought of in these terms.

All that matters are the different assumed times to publication (weeks to years), and then treating the strength of measures involved differently based on what is reasonable for the given use.

If you absolutely need something to never be published then encryption isn't the solution, and nor are computers generally.

Re:US defense secretary circumvents the official communicati... by VWWHFSfQ on Thursday May 01, 2025 @09:08AM (#43857201)
It's the entire mandate of the NSA's Utah Data Center. Archive all the world's encrypted data until such a time as it can be decrypted when either the algorithms have been cracked or machines are powerful enough to brute-force.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utah_Data_Center

Re:US defense secretary circumvents the official communicati... by rurban on Thursday May 01, 2025 @04:01PM (#43862684)
More like until they'll get the keys
Re:US defense secretary circumvents the official communicati... by fidotron on Thursday May 01, 2025 @04:26PM (#43862970)
Or maybe they found a way to outsource brute forcing the keys.
Re:US defense secretary circumvents the official communicati... by poincaredisk on Saturday May 03, 2025 @07:13AM (#43878287)
128 bits will never be bruteforced. There's nothing to outsource. The only actual risk is that the encryption algorithm is cracked.
Re:US defense secretary circumvents the official communicati... by worik on Saturday May 03, 2025 @10:07PM (#43883915)
> 128 bits will never be bruteforced

Famous last words

Re:US defense secretary circumvents the official communicati... by moandcompany on Thursday May 01, 2025 @02:10PM (#43861286)
Concur. This is part of why Suite A ciphers (algorithms) exist, and the second component includes robust key management practices are so important (this includes hardening of devices to prevent leakage of signals that could compromise those keys or the cryptographic processes themselves).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_Suite_A_Cryptography